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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the reformation of the land use planning appeals system in Ontario from the 
Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) to the Local Planning Appeal (LPAT) and beyond, and its impact 
on public participation and notions of good planning. This paper utilizes principles of urban justice 
to evaluate public participation by exploring the questions of ‘who is the public’ and ‘what are 
their interests?’ This endeavour is informed by the various voices involved in typical land use 
planning appeals including residents, planners, lawyers and academics. While this paper presents 
more questions than it answers, it does attempts to unpack the many tensions that exist in a land 
use planning regime with participatory and appeal rights. 
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Foreword 
 
My area of concentration is “Public Participation and Land Use Planning”, which is comprised of 
three components: public participation in planning, land use planning, and the politicization of 
planning. My paper on the impact of reforms to land use planning appeals on public participation 
and good planning, is directly related to my area of concentration, its components, and their 
respective learning objectives as set out below: 
Public Participation in Planning 
This paper deals directly and intimately with public participation in planning, and in particular, 
with the land use appeals process. It considers who participates, how they participate, what 
interests do they represent, and its overall impact on good planning.  
Land Use Planning 
Land use planning also forms a big part of this paper. Specifically, it explores the different land 
use planning appeal regimes and how they define what good land use planning entails. It also 
considers what makes the culture of land use planning in Ontario unique in facilitating such an 
appeal system. 
Politicization of Planning 
Although the politics of planning does not take centre stage, this paper does explore the various 
tensions in planning between public and private, politicians and constituents, and expertise vs lived 
experiences. Furthermore, this paper considers how best to mitigate the inequalities produced by 
the politics of planning. 
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1 
Public Participation and Good Planning?: From the OMB to LPAT and Back 
Introduction 
The protection of private property, whether from the potential adverse impacts by others 
or the right to utilize ones property to ones content, has brought forth endless tensions that land 
use planning seeks to mediate. These many tensions include, use value vs. exchange value, public 
vs. private, property owners vs. non-owners, and even among property owners themselves. When 
conflicts stemming from these tensions remain unresolved, a dispute mechanism is sometimes 
relied upon to make a determination on what is believed to be the best resolution for these tensions. 
In the province of the Ontario, this mechanism has historically been the Ontario Municipal Board 
(OMB).  
The OMB was first established in 1906 as the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board which 
was a travelling quasi-judicial body that heard claims and disputes over noise, vibration and other 
adverse impacts from the building and operation of the railways all across Ontario (Moore 2013; 
Howden 2017). In more recent history, the renamed and now defunct OMB is more widely known 
for its role in hearing land use planning disputes throughout the province. The OMB was comprised 
of provincially appointed individuals, referred to as board members, with various educational and 
professional backgrounds, who were tasked with adjudicating land use planning appeals and other 
matters such as expropriation, heritage conservation, property assessment, and environmental 
matters. While early iterations of OMB hearings were often heard by a panel of three members, in 
more recent history, most if not all OMB hearings are heard by a single member due to various 
reasons including limitations of resources and increasing case load (Moore 2013). The latest 
iteration of the OMB was comprised of 21 full-time members and 4 part-time members (Howden 
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2017). Without downplaying the OMBs importance in its other functions, references to the OMB 
in this paper will refer sole to its function as an adjudicator of land use planning appeals.  
Discourses on land use planning in Ontario cannot exclude a discussion about the OMB 
and its role. That is because the OMB has throughout its history been the final decision maker in 
land use planning matters in the province of Ontario, with few exceptions. The debate and 
narratives on the need to change the OMB did not changed overnight, but rather, have evolved 
over time. In the past, the OMB was once considered anti-development and a defender of local 
residents when it ruled in one of its first high profile cases in 1971, against the Metro Toronto 
council’s decision to expand the Allen Road south (known as the Spadina Expressway at the time), 
which would have cut through the Forest Hill neighbourhood, one of the most affluent 
neighbourhoods in Toronto (Moore 2013). The script and discourse in more recent history has 
flipped, painting the OMB as pro-development, criticized for its bias towards developers, 
preferential weighting of expert evidence, and expensive and lengthy hearings (Howden 2017). 
The early to mid 2000s seem to be the generally accepted time period in which the narrative 
changed considerably for a variety of reasons. First, the condominium boom brought forward an 
unprecedented amount of tall and dense development to the Toronto skyline, starting in the early 
2000s (Lehrer & Wieditz 2009). Moore (2013), collecting data on OMB matters during this period, 
found that the number of OMB matters heard by the OMB almost doubled by 2004 as compared 
to 2000. He also found that between 2000-2006, approximately 51% of development applications 
(Official Plan Amendments and/or Zoning By-law Amendments) were appealed to the OMB, 
which illustrates the increasing role it played in planning decisions. Second, in 2005 the province 
introduced several legislative frameworks in the form of amendments to Provincial Policy 
Statement (PPS) and the enactment of the Places to Grow Act which outlined broad provincial 
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interests in land use planning and provided a framework for which all planning decisions in the 
province must be consistent and conform with. This provided the development industry with the 
ammunition to justify their developments using language straight from the policies which included 
‘intensification’, ‘redevelopment’, and ‘urban growth centres’. Collectively, between the boom in 
development activity and increasing appeals to the OMB reinforced by expanding provincial 
policies, the spotlight and debate on the OMB and its role in shaping land use planning in the 
province evolved and intensified over time. While the OMB contains over 100 years of history, 
this paper will focus on the years immediately preceding its demise, on April 3, 2018, and onwards. 
This paper does not purport to be a complete account of all the changes to the OMB and its 
successors. Instead, this paper will highlight the elements that are most pertinent for considering 
the implications of land use planning appeal regimes on public participation and good planning. 
Independently, the areas of land use planning appeals, public participation and good 
planning have always garnered endless debate in both academia, the professional planning 
community, and the general public as to how they should be organized in society. Collectively, 
they present a serious challenge for analysis because of their contextually driven nature. Canada 
alone has variety of land use planning appeal regimes, dependent not only on various historical 
factors but also the province’s appetite for involvement in local municipal planning. For example, 
in Vancouver, land use planning appeals rights are severely limited and virtually non-existent, 
whereas in London, England, appeal rights are not extended to third parties – those who are not 
the applicant or approval authority (Wiley 2004). This paper will also explore the ‘public’ in public 
participation and the many ways that good planning can be defined in land use planning appeals. 
This paper is organized to begin with a brief overview of the research methodology, 
followed by an unpacking of the notions of good planning and public participation. The chapter 
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on good planning will be used to create a framework to evaluate the evolution in the land use 
planning appeals processes, while the chapter on public participation attempts to narrow what we 
mean when we say ‘public’. The next three chapters will apply the framework of good planning 
and public participation to the OMB, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT), and its 
successor, in that order. That is then followed by the concluding remarks. 
 
Methodology 
The research for this paper benefited from the combination of personal experience in the 
field of land use planning and observations that were made during attendances at OMB, LPAT and 
Divisional Court hearings. The primary data for this paper came from qualitative research in the 
form of 11 anonymous, semi-structured and open-ended interviews that were conducted face-to-
face for all but 1 interview, which was conducted by e-mail. Where follow up questions were 
warranted, those questions were posed through telephone or e-mail communication.   
The researcher generally encountered potential interview candidates during attendance at 
the aforementioned hearings. Other participants were referred to the researcher by some 
interviewees, also known as the snowball method. Some potential interview candidates were 
contacted based on their involvement in matters that the researcher came across when doing their 
research. The researcher targeted a wide range of participants with varying levels of experience 
and knowledge with this paper’s subject matter. The 11 interviewees comprise of 5 residents, 2 
professional planners, 2 lawyers practicing in municipal law, a planning professor, and a land use 
planning support centre staff member. A more fulsome list of interviewees can be found at 
Appendix A. 
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This papers heavy reliance on data from interviews is twofold. First, there exists a 
significant gap in the literature on land use planning appeals and public participation post OMB, 
due in part to how recent things have transpired. Second, it is one thing to speculate on how 
nuances in land use planning appeal procedures will impact participants in theory, but the more 
fruitful approach would be to extract the lived experiences of those who have been intimately 
involved in those processes and procedures to better illustrate how the impacts play out in practice. 
 
Chapter 1 – Good Planning 
 No two words, when used together, have more significance to the coordination of land use 
than the words “good” and “planning”. Good planning, often loosely used, provides the legitimacy, 
rationale, and justification for land use initiatives. This term is used liberally by all those involved 
in land use planning, including residents, politicians and experts. Despite the significance of this 
term, there exists no consensus on what constitutes good planning. Good planning is contextual in 
the sense that it has different meanings for different people in varying circumstances including 
where it is situated physically, politically, and socio-economically. 
 This chapter engages both literary sources and interview responses to unpack what people 
mean when they categorize planning initiatives as good planning. The various backgrounds and 
professional and lived experiences of the interviewees provide a diversity in the good planning 
discourse that is lacking in academic literature alone. When asked what good planning meant to 
them, residents interviewed for this paper gave a variety of responses. One resident cited built-
form, fitting within the neighbourhood context, and a collaborative effort between the applicant 
and approval authority as components of good planning (Public Interviewee 2). Another resident 
characterized good planning as an implementation of a “commonly held vision” (Public 
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Interviewee 5). One resident, a retired municipal transportation planner and now active 
neighbourhood association resident, referred to good planning as consistency and conformity to 
various municipal and provincial policies and guidelines, in addition to being in the public interest 
and in the absence of adverse consequences (Public Resident 1). 
 Public Resident 1’s reference to conformity and consistency to planning instruments 
(policies and guidelines) stem from their former role as a professional planner and civil servant. 
Other civil servants echoed similar sentiments. The municipal planner interviewed explained that 
on top of consideration for municipal and provincial plans, good planning includes talking to the 
community (Industry Interviewee 2). The municipal planner also emphasized that local Official 
Plans were more important for them in arriving at good planning than provincial planning 
instruments. Industry Interviewee 5 boasts an extensive resume including planning as a civil 
servant, as a private consultant, and a professor of planning at an Ontario university. When asked 
what good planning meant to them, they chuckled before responding: 
“You kind of know when you get there, when the majority of the relevant experts 
and community are in agreement. You don’t get that consensus all that often, but 
when the majority of folks (experts, politicians and neighbourhood groups) are in 
agreement, you know that you found your best fit and solution” (Industry 
Interviewee 5). 
 
 In contrasts with residents and civil servants, the private sector planner interviewed focused 
on the context of good planning and what they called “tolerable differences” (Industry Interviewee 
1). According to them, good planning – as it pertains to development – must understand the context 
in which a proposal is situated. These contextual factors include physical and infrastructural 
matters. They also emphasized that good planning may contain perceived impacts, however, these 
impacts shall not be beyond a “threshold of acceptability” for the given location and policy context, 
leading to “tolerable differences” of planning impacts from one location to the next (Ibid).  
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 Despite the various perspectives on what constitutes good planning, one component of 
good planning that is scarcely contested is the notion that it involves planning for the public 
interest, however, this in of itself is cumbersome. The use of the word public interest, like good 
planning, assumes that there is singularity and universality to the notion (Barnes et al. 2003). This 
assumption that the public is a homogenous entity that shares a single interest is highly 
problematic. The reality is that capitalist society is not a utopia of equal and like-minded 
individuals, but a mosaic of individuals and groups characterized by social, economic and political 
inequalities.  As such, the use of the notion public interest requires responding to the question of 
who is the public and what are their interests?  The endeavour of defining the public will be 
explored in greater depth in Chapter 2 with the discussion of public participation. 
 Traditionally, the public interest was a singular concept derived by planners with reference 
to “expert knowledge and public preferences” (Valiante 2016, 107; Fainstein 2010). This was used 
to justify and rationalize planning decisions of approval authorities, leaving little recourse against 
those that have categorized themselves to have been acting in the public interest. Over time, at 
least in academia, it has become increasingly accepted that a singular public interest does not exist 
and instead, is replaced by discourses of multiple public interests (Valiante 2016). Notwithstanding 
this acceptance, planning industry experts (planners, architects, engineers, lawyers, and 
adjudicators) continue to take the lead role in defining these interests in relation to good planning.  
Industry Interviewee 5 illustrates this sentiment when talking about the process of deriving at good 
planning solutions: “As a practitioner, I’ve often said that I usually don’t need the public to figure 
out what the best answers are, but I need the public to verify if they think these are the best answers 
and if they are willing to live with and get behind it.” While not ruling out the role of public 
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participation in defining good planning solutions, Industry Interviewee 5 expresses that public 
participation often takes the most time and yields the least results.   
 Given the heterogeneity of public interests, good planning must be considered a 
compromise where the outcomes of planning will advantage or disadvantage some more than 
others. Accordingly, conceptions of good planning tend to be defined or rationalized on a 
quantitative basis, which include the greatest good for the greatest number and on a cost benefit 
analysis (Fainstein 2010). The former stipulates that good planning positively impacts the greatest 
number of persons while the latter is a calculation on whether the benefits from a planning decision 
will outweigh its potential adverse impacts. Where these methods for defining or rationalizing 
succeed is to demonstrate that good planning is not an absolute. That is, good planning is not like 
a light switch that is on or off. Rather, there a scalability to good planning which makes it possible 
to have multiple planning alternatives with various degrees of good planning. 
 
Good Planning and Justice  
 Given the challenges that accompany defining good planning and public interests, one way 
to address this problem is to consider good planning from a justice lens. This section of the chapter 
relies on a variety of works on planning with justice. Don Mitchell, in discussing Henri Lefebvre’s 
concept of ‘the right to the city’, asserts that the city is a work of art in which everyone participates 
in its production (Mitchell 2003, 17). Talking specifically about social justice, Iris Marion Young 
states that: 
 “social justice concerns the degree to which a society contains and supports the 
institutional conditions necessary for the realization of…the values comprised in a 
good life…: (1) developing and exercising one’s capacities and expressing one’s 
experience, and (2) participating in determining one’s actions and the conditions of 
one’s action” (1990, 37).  
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Leonie Sandercock (1997) talks about a just city from a social inclusion standpoint, whereby 
differences are recognized, tolerated, and respected.  Building upon these notions of justice, this 
paper relies on the urban justice framework of Susan Fainstein’s (2010) Just City, whereby urban 
justice in planning involves the intersectionality and tensions between democracy, equity and 
diversity. Her call for considering planning and justice together stems the prevalence of the 
neoliberal agenda in the reorganization of state planning priorities. The neoliberal state, more often 
than not, prioritizes the planning of cities to be competitive in order to attract investment. This 
strong bias for economic growth is often at a great detriment to democracy, equity and diversity. 
This manifestation of business domination in state planning can lead to the logic that “a better city 
is a more middle-class city even when the majority of citizens are poor and working-class people” 
(Fainstein & Fainstein 1983, 252).  
Equity, according to Fainstein (2010), refers to both material and non-material distribution. 
This includes the fair distribution of physical resources but also fair treatment within social 
relations. Diversity refers to both of people and the physical environment. Democracy touches 
upon the various degrees in which the public participates in planning the city. Democracy, can be 
direct and indirect. The former being active participation through communicative and deliberative 
processes while the latter is through one’s ability to vote for an elected representative. Democracy, 
in and of itself, does not guarantee justice. In fact, “in an unequal society, democracy and justice 
are frequently at odds” (Fainstein 2010, 30). 
 What does planning based on principles of justice look like? John Rawls’ principle of 
justice asserts that where social and economic inequalities exist, “they are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of society” (Rawls & Kelly 2001, 42). That is to suggest 
that justice doesn’t necessarily mean the absence of inequality, but rather the mitigation of 
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disadvantage and the lessening of inequality (Fainstein 2010). As a result, good planning exists 
where any inequality that stems from planning benefits those who are the least well off. For 
instance, in a proposed redevelopment requiring demolition of rental housing for a condominium, 
good planning in this instance would require the existing tenants to benefit the most from the 
outcome of the development, which could be a combination of compensation, temporary relocation 
in the immediate area, and secured affordable housing in perpetuity. In the context of public 
participation in land use planning appeals, good planning would exist when the voices of those 
typically unheard – the tenants in this case – are represented in a meaningful way. The least 
advantaged members in this case is not the landlord or developer, or an adjacent land owner, but 
in other cases they could be. More likely than not, the least advantaged member may be the 
homeless, impoverished, impaired, or the youth.  
 While this has not been an exhaustive discussion on good planning, it is sufficient for 
creating a framework and criteria upon which we can evaluate land use planning appeal processes 
and procedures with a perspective on urban justice. This will be further supplemented by our 
discussion on public participation in the following chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 – Public Participation in Planning 
 Public participation, in and of itself, remains one of the highly contested concepts in 
academia. Analogies for public participation, such as and how it is like eating spinach (Arnstein 
1969) or that it is the “Achilles heel of planning” (Beneviste 1989, 145) have been tirelessly used 
to describe its many contradictions. We have also seen public participation framed around 
principles of democracy, rooted in values and virtues which can be situated as far back as the Greek 
polis (Day 1997). Conversely, an equally strong debate exists for opponents of public participation, 
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including claims that direct forms of participation, as advocated for in ancient Greece, is not 
feasible in modern society (Stivers 1990) and that it would be socially unstable, resulting to mob 
rule (Grant 1994).  The contestation on public participation is further complicated by the lack of 
consensus in the literature on how one can go about evaluating and comparing public participation. 
Even Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation isn’t free from criticism. One critic points out that 
matters that call for public participation can, and normally does, take on multiple degrees of 
participation throughout its progression (Lane 2005). Any one single degree of participation cannot 
sufficiently categorize the organic way in which public participation plays out, as one case may 
require different degrees of engagement and different times throughout its processes, making it 
hard to pinpoint one degree of participation. Furthermore, there exists many challenges to 
evaluating and comparing different instances and forms of public participation because they are 
founded on different theoretical frameworks, have varying degrees of ‘success’, situated in 
different contexts and involve different actors (Day 1997; Lane 2005).  
Fainstein, in speaking to the evolution of demands for public participation, highlights the 
dangers of taking public participation in planning, in and of itself, at face value: 
“The initial demands for citizen participation in bureaucratic decision making 
originated with low-income groups wanting increased benefits. As time passed, 
however, participatory mechanism primarily became a vehicle for middle-class 
interests. As such, they represented a move toward democratizing the planning 
process but not usually in the direction of redistribution, and that always posed the 
threat of co-optation. Moreover, neighbourhood activists are never more than a small 
proportion of a community thus, their claim to legitimacy is always suspect. 
Sometimes they may genuinely reflect a broad constituency, but they may also 
become a narrow clique unwelcoming to outsiders and serving their own personal 
desire for prominence” (Fainstein 2010, 66). 
 
Freeman and Hume (2015) echo this position that public participation often happens on a very 
local scale. They explain that this is why major city-wide mistakes, based on political 
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considerations alone – like the Sheppard Subway Line or failure to take down a section of the 
Gardiner in Toronto – are allowed to happen with little public input: 
 
“The problem is that it is difficult for groups to mobilize around the process. Citizen 
groups are almost always organized around local neighbourhood issues…Local 
groups find it hard to understand how the decisions impact on their community and 
so they don’t get involved” (Freeman & Hume 2015, 186). 
 
Another challenge in public participation, today especially, is that technology is changing the way 
the public thinks of participation. For instance, the prevalence of social media as a forum for 
participation through the voicing of opinions electronically on the internet, doesn’t change the fact 
that physical public hearings are still the “legal instrument of decision-making” (Evans-Cowley & 
Hollander 2010, 399). 
Academics tend to also have differing opinions on how to structure or prioritize 
participation in planning. Fung and Wright call for Empowered Participatory Governance, based 
on the principles of practical orientation, bottom-up participation, and deliberative solution 
generation in order to “deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in and 
influence policies which directly their lives” (2003, 5).  According to New Urbanists, “it is easier 
to establish good principles of design than to secure a perfect democratic process. Principles must 
take primacy. Good designs trumps democracy” (Grant 2006, 185). This sentiment highlights one 
of the primary contestations in public participation in planning, which consists of a tension 
between democracy and bureaucracy (Day 1997). More specifically, the tension that exists 
between participatory planning by those considered laypersons and technocratic planning by those 
considered to be experts. A consensus has yet to have been reached, in theory or in practice, as to 
where the line should fall between the two. On the one hand, you have a direct form of democracy 
whereas on the other, you have an expertise driven representative form of democracy – particularly 
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when it comes to civil servants within the bureaucracy. As we shall see in Chapters 3 and onwards, 
these tensions are constantly in play when it comes to land use planning appeals. At the end of the 
day, the debate between these tensions ought to surround how public participation can supplement 
the function of experts, rather than how it can replace it (Vestbro 2012). 
The political climate in which public participation is situated plays a big role in how it is 
organized and the degree to which it impacts planning decision. This is especially true in the 
Canadian context where all three level of governments have an hierarchical interest in the 
outcomes of planning decisions. The implications on public participation are best illustrated by 
Fainstein’s discussion of Robert Dahl’s Chinese box problem of participation and power: 
“at the level of the neighbourhood, there is the greatest opportunity for democracy 
but the least amount of power; as we scale up the amount of decision-making power 
increases, but the potential of people to affect outcomes diminishes. The city level 
therefore is one layer in the hierarchy of governance” (Fainstein 2010, 17). 
 
This is particularly true in Canada, where the Constitution Act sets out that municipalities are 
creatures of the provinces. Especially in Ontario, where the government is hyperactive in 
protecting its interests through an extraordinary amount of planning instruments like the Planning 
Act, PPS, and the Places to Grow Act, just to name a few. 
The dialogue on public participation in planning must begin with the consideration of who 
or what constitutes the public. Notions of ‘the public’ are socially constructed “out of a range of 
discourses and ideologies that are historically embedded in institutional practices” and require an 
understanding of the power relations under which it operates (Barnes et al 2003, 380). Thus, the 
term ‘public’, in public participant, within the context of the land use planning is ambiguous. In 
theory, public participants in land use planning can refer to anyone who wishes to participate, 
including the applicant (often the landowner or developer), a neighbour, a ratepayer’s association, 
and the approval authority (Industry Interviewee 1). In practice, however, public participants are 
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often used to refer to those who are considered non-experts or laypersons, and who do not a have 
pecuniary interest in the outcome of a matter (Public Interviewee 1 & 2; Industry Interviewee 4). 
Expertise and pecuniary interest seem to be the factors in the divide between what is public and 
what is private. 
This distinction between public and private tends to create a lot of tension along the same 
lines of the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy. This othering of matters and entities that are private in 
land use planning matters tend to carry with it negative connotations. An example would be the 
use of ‘private’ in conjunction the word ‘developer’. One of the major criticisms of the OMB is 
that it is ‘pro-development’ and is biased for ‘private developers’ (Howden 2017). This use of the 
words seems to suggest that developments and their developers are necessarily bad or in opposition 
to the ‘public’. Peter Howden, a former OMB member, explains that private ‘developers’ come in 
all shapes and sizes: 
“The person called a ‘developer’ may be a property owner who is arranging for a 
house of his own to be built, or he or she could be funding a large mixed use proposal 
like a regional shopping and commercial centre, or she could be putting together an 
affordable housing project at a density per unit that will allow her to make money 
and assist in housing families who badly need places of their own” (Howden 2017, 
53). 
 
As such, private ‘development’ is usually reserved to categorize major construction projects, when 
it ought to be used more generally for any land use initiative that brings change and generates a 
profit (Ibid). The main takeaway here is that there must be caution exercised when defining and 
designating something as ‘public’. The context in which the ‘public’ is constituted has implications 
for not only who is accounted, but more importantly, those who are unaccounted. 
 We now have a framework of good planning and public participation upon which we can 
evaluate land use planning appeals processes and procedures in the context of the OMB and its 
successors. To summarize, the ‘public’ in public participation refers to those who are third parties 
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and do not have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of an appeal.  Good planning refers to planning 
outcomes that are founded upon principles of urban justice that include democracy, equity, and 
diversity. Good planning in land use planning dictates that any inequalities that stem from planning 
decisions must benefit the most disadvantaged. On the other hand, good planning in the context of 
public participation in land use planning appeals exist where any inequalities in the appeal 
processes benefit the least advantaged. 
 
Chapter 3 – OMB (1906-2018) 
 The OMB was like no other land use planning appeal body in North America. While most 
land use planning matters are considered to be local in nature, and thus dominated by municipal 
governments, the OMB had the final say in most land use planning matters in Ontario. The OMB 
derived its powers from a variety of planning legislations including the Planning Act and the 
Ontario Municipal Board Act. Throughout its history, it received various criticisms including that 
it was pro-development, anti-democratic, expert biased, and not conducive to public participation 
(Howden 2017; Moore 2013). Using the frameworks established in Chapters 1 and 2, we will now 
explore how good planning and public participation is defined at the OMB and then evaluate how 
public participation at the OMB stands up to principles of urban justice. 
 
The OMB and Good Planning  
 The OMB is commonly referred to as quasi-judicial administrative tribunal because its 
rules and procedures are similar to courts, which consists of an adversarial contest between parties 
with elements of disclosure, oral hearings, witness testimony, and cross examination. Where the 
OMB departs from judicial courts is that the OMB is not bound by its past decision. Judicial courts 
 
 
 
16 
in Ontario, on the other hand, follow a common law system whereby deference is given to previous 
decisions of the same court, unless the decision was made in an error of law. Rather than make a 
ruling grounded in common law, the OMB makes its decision on what it believes to constitute 
good planning.  According to Peter Howden, a former OMB member and judge of the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice, the role of OMB is to: 
“rule in accordance with principles of good planning; they include the OP policies 
(regional and lower tier) in force, the zoning by-laws and provincial planning 
statements, in addition to the generally accepted tenets of good planning principles 
within the planning profession” (Howden 2017, 56). 
 
 This emphasis on policy and principles within the planning profession suggests an element 
of expertise to the establishment and application of good planning. This gives rise to a common 
criticism lobbied at the OMB, which is its bias towards expert evidence, particularly that of 
professional planners, when determining what is good planning (Moore 2013). In response, 
Howden asserts that it is a tendency, rather than a bias, towards expert planning evidence for the 
reasons set out in the principles of good planning above, whether that be the from the planner for 
the developer, approval authority, or interveners. As we shall see in the following section, this bias 
or tendency has considerable implications on public participation at the OMB. 
 The other criteria,  an extension of good planning, that the OMB considers in rendering its 
decision is whether the outcome of the proposal is in the public interest. While these two criteria 
are not enshrined in legislation, they are implied and supported by case law (Valiante 2016). John 
Chipman, extensively studying OMB decisions between 1971 and 2000 asserts that with respect 
to determining the public interest: 
“Given the nature of the matters before it, the board has frequently identified the 
decisions of municipal councils as the most authentic expression of the public 
interest. It has treated the residents of a municipality, as represented by its locally 
elected council, as the single most important interest group. More specifically, this 
has meant that it has generally accepted approved official plans, council decisions 
with respect to zoning by-laws, and the approval of plans of subdivision as the truest 
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expressions of the public interest. The evidence from the review periods and the lack 
of deviation in its views throughout strongly suggests that this approach was well 
established prior to 1971 and has been followed consistently since then” (Chipman 
2002, p.29). 
 
Chipman also asserts that only in cases where the approval authority refuses an application or fails 
to make a decision within the prescribed time, does the OMB revoke any special deference given 
to the municipality in its determination of the public interest (2002). Valiante, in quoting a recent 
OMB decision, noted that “there are ‘multiple public interests’ that [the OMB] must balance” 
including: 
• “the ‘local interest of the surrounding community that would be affected’; 
• the ‘municipal interest, which has land use control on an affected area and the moral and 
legal responsibility to maintain, among other things, public health and safety of the 
inhabitants’; 
• the ‘[p]rovincial interest’ regarding overall planning; and 
• the ‘environmental interest’ and public health and safety” (Valiante 2016, 119; Re Town of 
Oakville OPA No 296, 2010, 64 OMBR 55 at 72-73). 
In balancing theses multiple interest, it is the role of the OMB “to ensure that one ‘special’ ‘public 
interest’ does not unfairly prevail over another ‘public interest’” (Ibid).  
 
The OMB and Public Participation 
 Public participation at the OMB is a right embedded into various statutes, legislation and 
rules in Ontario. For example, the Planning Act, the OMB’s most important enabling statute, is 
enshrined with the principle of public notice, “which encourages public participation on planning 
matters that are decided by municipal committees and councils, and on appeal, by the OMB” (Tang 
& Suriano 2017, 1). There are two broad categories of public participants at the OMB: those with 
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legal status (parties and participants) and those without (casual observer). The OMB clearly 
distinguishes between the legal statuses of parties and participants in its Rules of Practices and 
Procedures: 
“‘party’ includes a person entitled by the statute under which the proceeding arises 
to be a party to the appeal, or, those persons whom the Board accepts or adds as 
parties to fully participate in a hearing event. The role of a party is set out in these 
Rules and includes such activities as presenting and cross-examining witnesses, 
exchanging and receiving documents and presenting submissions to the Board;” 
 
“’participant is an individual, group or corporation who wishes to make a statement 
to the Board at a time set for such statements but who does not wish to participate 
fully throughout a hearing and may attend only part of a hearing;” (OMB Rules of 
Practice and Procedures 2017, 4). 
 
The important distinction made the by the OMB is that parties are able to ‘fully participate’ in 
proceedings, whereas participants are simply there to provide their statement. Those who seek to 
obtain party status generally want the ability to submit evidence from their independent expert 
consultants and to have the ability to test the evidence of the opposing party or parties.  
 Locating the ‘public’ in public participation at the OMB can be tricky, as outlined in 
Chapter 2. For the purpose of this paper and from an urban justice perspective, public participant 
at the OMB shall refer to third parties, regardless of legal status (party, participant or observer), 
that do not have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of an appeal. The pecuniary interest component 
is important because a third party, in and of itself, can refer to anyone including the developer. 
Legally, first parties include the individual or entity that initiates the appeal to the OMB and the 
approval authority which often the council of the municipality. If a neighbouring resident initiates 
an appeal of a city council decision to approve a development application, they would be 
considered a first party and the developer would be considered a third party. Notwithstanding this, 
we will not be including a third party developer in our definition of public participant due to their 
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the appeal. We can advance our definition of public 
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participants one step further and distinguish between represented and unrepresented public 
participants.  The former consists of those who have party status – either from initiating an appeal 
or seeking party status from the OMB –  and a majority of whom, have legal and/or expert planning 
representation.  The latter, on the other hand, are those who wish only to provide a personal and 
unqualified statement without the benefit of legal representation or expert opinion evidence.  
 
Factors that hinder Public Participation at the OMB 
 Several characteristics of the OMB and its proceedings have been commonly cited, both in 
the literature and from the interviews, as factors that hinder public participation. First, the 
formalities and legalistic nature of an OMB proceeding creates an intimating and uncomfortable 
environment for public participants. Second, OMB proceedings are a highly resource driven 
process from a time and monetary perspective. Third, expert evidence is weighed more 
significantly than statements from laypersons or those not qualified to give expert opinion. Finally, 
the threat of potential costs award against public participants with party status can be a deterrent 
to those who wish to ‘fully participate at the OMB. We shall now go into further details about 
these factors. 
Formalities 
 OMB hearings play out in a legal, formal and litigious manner. It is often a contest between 
expert opinions conducted in a legalese and customary manner which may seem foreign to those 
unrepresented public participants whom are more accustomed to participation in settings such as 
town hall meetings and public workshops. Those in attendance must rise when the OMB member 
enters or exits the room. Anyone providing a testimony or statement at an OMB hearing must 
swear an oath or affirmation and is also subject to cross examination by the legal counsel of any 
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of the other parties. The purpose of cross examination is to allow the other parties the opportunity 
to test and undermine the evidence or statements provided to the OMB. This process of cross 
examination can not only be very challenging for public participants but also for experts as well. 
Even experts before the OMB are subject be tested for their qualification to provide expert opinion. 
Experts must sign off on an Acknowledgement of Expert’s Duty form to, among other things, 
confirm and acknowledge that their duty is to provide evidence that is “fair, objective, and non-
partisan” and evidence that is only within their area of expertise (Ontario Municipal Board 2017, 
31). 
 A former manager of transportation planning for the City of Toronto described their first 
time giving evidence and being under cross examination at the OMB as “terrifying” (Public 
Interviewee 1). While they did advise that they became more comfortable after exposure to a few 
more hearings, they asserted that for most public participants, it’s probably their one and only time 
at the OMB so they don’t get the benefit of accumulated experienced. Even still, after decades in 
the role of an expert planner for the municipality, their retirement and transition into an active 
public participant wasn’t seamless. In describing how their participation differed, they stated: 
“even though I was experienced as a witness, I wasn't experienced as a member of the public and 
being treated that way. It was quite uncomfortable” (Public Interviewee 1). A municipal lawyer 
explains how public participants, despite their expertise, can be excluded from providing expert 
opinion and have their impartiality questioned: 
“Even if the public have a professional background – architect, planner, or lawyer – 
when they come before the Tribunal, their statements are not considered expert 
opinion because they're members of the community. So they can't be unbiased and 
dispassionate experts. Conversely, experts must sign an [Acknowledgment of] 
Expert's Duty form, which confirms that they don't have any bias or interest beyond 
providing their candid expert opinion on policy.” (Industry Interviewee 4). 
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The formalities of the process define the experts from the laypersons and the impartial from the 
partial. This is a significant departure from the informal settings that most public participants are 
accustomed to and can a be a deterrence for public participation. 
 Resources 
 OMB proceedings can be time consuming and expensive endeavours. The length of 
hearings are generally one to four weeks and sometimes even longer. Not only can hearings take 
a long time to play out, but scheduling dates for the hearing can take from six months to over a 
year based on the backlog in the system or delays due to adjournments, mediation, and settlement 
negotiations. The length of hearings can be contributed to the de novo oral hearings at the OMB, 
which are essentially hearings ‘of new’. This means that what is before the OMB is not a review 
of the decision or non-decision of council, but a brand-new matter where parties painstakingly 
walk the board member through every detail of an application, almost as if there is an expectation 
that the member has not reviewed any of the documents pertaining to the matter prior to the 
hearing. As a result of the length and effort involved in de novo hearings, the costs involved in 
these appeals can be anywhere from the mid-six figures to over a million dollars depending on the 
complexity of the application being appealed (Howden 2017). 
 Expertise 
 The high costs can also be attributed to the wide range of expert evidence that is often used 
at OMB hearings including that of professional planners, urban designers, architects and various 
engineers. Due to the fact that city planning itself is highly dependent on the expertise of those 
within the planning industry to review and process development applications, the same category 
of experts is deferred to by the OMB to establish what is good planning, arguably it’s most 
important criteria when making a decision (Moore 2013). This gravitation towards expert opinion 
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can leave unrepresented public participants feeling like they lack the “credibility” or “clout” that 
experts have at the OMB (Public Interviewee 1; Public Interviewee 2). This could lead to the 
feeling that their statement and participation has little or no impact on the outcome of the 
proceeding. 
 Ute Lehrer has covered many cases before the OMB that illustrate the impact of expertise 
on public participation and greater social implications.  In her piece reflecting on the developments 
in the West Queen West Triangle, Lehrer (2008) documents how the expansive and unprecedented 
public participation efforts by Active 18 and the community were, to a great extent, wasted by an 
appeal to the OMB, despite great efforts to avoid the time consuming and expensive process. By 
contrast, the efforts of the East Toronto Community Coalition (ETCC) to oppose a SmartCentres 
development proposed in Toronto’s Studio District was able to enlist the efforts of many members 
of the planning community, who are considered ‘experts’ and speak the language of the OMB 
(Lehrer & Wieditz 2009).  They assert that the use of this legal and expert language alienates issues 
of “economic justice, poverty, and gentrification” further from reality of those directly impacted 
by the decisions of the OMB (Ibid, 153).  The eventual success of ETCC at the OMB illustrates 
the effort, expertise, and discourses required to navigate the processes of the OMB in a meaningful 
way and the potential social consequences that it may have. 
 Threat of Costs 
 The threat of potential costs awarded against a public participant, who has obtained party 
status to ‘fully participate’, has been cited by one interviewee as one of the deciding factors on 
shaping how their neighbourhood association chooses to participate in land use planning appeals 
at the OMB (Public Interviewee 2). Despite the association representing approximately 35,000 
residents in a neighbourhood at the eastern end of downtown Toronto, their annual operating 
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budget from memberships is only $13,000. With a limited budget, the threat of potentially having 
to pay for the costs of other parties played a role in the association passing a motion to only be 
involved at the OMB as participant. While the threat of costs is particularly impactful for non-
affluent individuals, it is also true for unincorporated neighbourhood or ratepayer’s associations, 
who must be incorporated in order to initiate an appeal. Where associations are unincorporated, 
individuals must submit appeals in their personal capacity and assume all liabilities associated with 
the appeal. 
 
Factors Conducive to Public Participation at the OMB 
 When asked to discuss factors about the OMB that made it conducive to public 
participation, it was not surprising that none of the Public Interviewees were able to offer anything. 
Despite the perceived rigidity of the OMB system, there was a lot of built in flexibility and 
accommodation for unrepresented public participants. The only strict requirement with respect to 
participation at the OMB is imposed by Section 24(1) of the Planning Act, which stipulates that 
appeal rights will only be afforded to “a person or public body who, before the plan was adopted, 
made oral submissions at a public meeting or written submissions to the council” (Planning Act. 
RSO 1990, c. P13, s 24). Other than that requirement for appellants, flexibility was extended to 
how other public parties or participant could participate. For instance, while the pre-hearing was 
meant to be the forum where are interested parties and participants would identify themselves in 
anticipation for the hearing, one municipal lawyer advised that the OMB was accommodating to 
those who wanted to be added at a later stage in the process: 
“The flexibility allowed the participants to show up and sometimes decide the day 
of the hearing event whether they wish to speak or not. Squeezing in participants 
when timelines benefitted them. They can't be expected to sit through a 2-4 week 
hearing to wait for the moment that they will be heard.  While participant status is a 
legal status, which has to be granted just like party status, I have to say that from my 
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own personal observations, it was, if ever, rarely refused as any participant who 
showed a genuine interest in a proposal was granted participants status by the 
[OMB]. Even at late requests or people who would show up after procedural orders 
are issued after of prehearing conferences were held. If they showed up that day of 
the hearing, more often than not, you would see the [OMB] member being flexible 
and saying, yes, we can fit you in, we can hear you, and give you the opportunity to 
participate” (Industry Interviewee 4). 
 
 Aside from OMB members accommodating for unrepresented participants from a 
procedural standpoint, lawyers for opposing parties were also generally respectful of 
unrepresented public participants. One active resident advised that in their experience at the OMB 
and in speaking with private sector lawyers, there is an unwritten rule that “you don’t go after” 
unrepresented public participants (Public Interviewee 2). A private sector lawyer, who 
acknowledged that a lawyer’s number one duty is to their client, acknowledged that they should 
still treat the general public fairly and with respect, however, the public could still be subjected to 
tough questions in a respectful manner (Industry Interviewee 3). A public-sector lawyer agreed 
stating: 
“[a] respectful cross examination doesn’t mean it can’t be forceful or effective. 
[Public] participants don’t get the same level of cross examination as an expert 
witness would because their opinion is not expertly weighted. I’ve also seen residents 
say things that are outside the scope of a planning consideration or potentially 
slanderous that merit strong cross examination. [Conversely], I’ve also seen some 
lawyers go very hard on a resident for a simple non-contentious point. It’s a 
complicated issue but the fact is, cross examination is founded in our principles of 
law and there is no way around it. You can’t be allowed to just get up and say 
whatever you want without the potential for that to be tested” (Industry Interviewee 
4). 
 
 While the threat of cost is real in theory, in practice however, costs awarded against 
unrepresented public participants are the exception rather than the rule. Tang & Suriano (2017) 
suggests that case law dictates that “the standard of conduct demanded of an unsophisticated party 
is lower than is demanded of a party who can hire professionals to advise it” (18). The OMB has 
extensive experience dealing with a range in types of unrepresented participants: 
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“The Ontario Municipal Board has long experience with unrepresented groups and 
individuals. They range from those who do absolutely no preparation for their 
hearings to those who turn their participation into a full-time job. They also represent 
the full spectrum of knowledge, ability and experience; from the egregiously (and 
sometimes deliberately) uniformed to “amateur experts” who in virtue of sheer 
intelligence and hard work make crucial contributions to the hearing process. And 
finally, they run the gamut from the well-meaning, public-spirited citizen to the 
manipulative or obstructionist interloper” ([1995] O.M.B.D. No. 3 [Panze]; Tang & 
Suriano 2017, 18). 
 
As such, the OMB is careful to establish a high threshold for cost awards against unrepresented 
participants in order to ensure that public participation is not discouraged. To achieve this, the 
OMB utilizes three standards for assessing the participation of a party for the purpose of 
determining the applicability of cost awards: (1) the amount of preparation undertaken, (2) the 
knowledge and experience offered, and (3) the purity of motive for participating (Ibid). These 
standards ensure that public participants don’t appeal matters to the OMB without the intent to 
make a case and/or solely for the purpose of delaying an application, but also to make it an easy 
threshold for genuine public participants to meet. 
 Finally, with respect to expertise, while hiring expert witnesses for OMB proceedings may 
not be a financial option for most public participants, a majority of the individuals interviewed 
agreed that public participants could contribute with another form of expertise, specifically when 
it comes to their knowledge and experience on their own neighbourhood or community. One active 
resident who is experienced with the OMB advised that residents are experts on the context of their 
neighborhood and as such, they can use this to their advantage in creating a narrative that cannot 
be easily undermined by opposing experts (Public Interviewee 2). This narrative consists of 
painting a mental picture for the OMB member on what it is like to walk down a particular street, 
on a particular day and time of day, and illustrating the emotions, feelings and visuals that form 
the context and character of a particular neighbourhood. This often gives a very specific context 
to an application that the OMB member – an adjudicator that travels across Ontario from one case 
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to the next – cannot appreciate because of their inability to conduct site visits or lack of familiarity 
with a particular neighbourhood. The public-sector lawyer concurred, emphasizing that public 
participants “give a level of specificity to the potential impact or benefit that a development may 
have on a certain neighbourhood, community or property context” (Industry Interviewee 4). 
 
The OMB and the Just City 
 In this section, we apply the notions of Good Planning and Public Participation, within the 
context of the OMB, to the criteria of the Just City that was laid out in Chapter 1. The purpose is 
not to determine whether the outcomes and decisions of the OMB result to a Just City – that is an 
entirely separate endeavour – but rather to test whether the OMB and its processes, as it pertains 
public participants, promotes a land use planning appeals process that is based on the values of 
democracy, equity, diversity, and ultimately urban justice.  
 
 Democracy 
 One of the biggest criticisms against the OMB is that it is undemocratic because it takes 
the decision-making process over land use planning matters, predominantly local in nature, out of 
the hands of democratically elected officials and into the hands of a board members that are 
provincially appointed (Howden 2017). As such, the public cannot hold OMB members 
accountable for their decisions in the same way that they can do for their local politicians with 
each election cycle. When asked to comment on the criticisms of the OMB for being undemocratic, 
a private sector lawyer commented that: 
“Democracy has limits. Just because you vote for someone and their decisions can 
be overturned later doesn’t mean that its undemocratic. There are limits to that 
democracy. I understand where the criticism is coming from because of what 
politicians are elected to do is to represent their constituents. The conflict here of 
course is that election cycles are every three or four years but planning decisions are 
 
 
 
27 
often dealing with the long term…to plan for communities 10, 20 or even greater 
years in the future. There is always going to be this conflict between what is best 
perhaps for the municipality and for the development of land in the long term and 
what the general community would like to see happen in the short term” (Industry 
Interviewee 3). 
 
These narratives deal with the role of the OMB in reviewing and potentially substituting the 
decisions of a democratically elected body with its own, rather than the process itself. Another 
way to think of democracy in relation to the OMB is a more direct form of democracy in 
participation in OMB proceedings. As we discussed above, with very few exceptions, anyone can 
attend, speak, and potentially influence OMB hearings to various degrees. The limited exception 
would be in mediation and settlement negotiations which are limited to those with party status. 
Furthermore, in most instances, constituents continue to be democratically represented by their 
elected politicians through motions at city council to direct city lawyers and planning experts to 
represent council at the OMB to advance the position of the city. Overall, the absence of physical 
roadblocks to attend and to participate in manner of one’s choosing would earn the OMB a passing 
grade for democracy. 
Equity 
 To reemphasize, equity according to Fainstein, refers to access to material and non-material 
resources, rather than the equality of those resources (Fainstein 2010). Although it is true that 
unrepresented public participants have a particular role and neighbourhood ‘expertise’ to offer in 
OMB proceedings, the truth to the matter is that due to breadth and depth of the planning 
instruments and principles that the OMB must take into account, there is an inherent preference 
for those who are subject matter experts to assist the OMB in constituting what is good planning. 
The great disparity in financial resources – while not alone guaranteeing success at the OMB – has 
potential implications for everyone, not just deep pocketed developers. For instance, a homeowner 
who wants to make minor modifications to their home could have their minor variance application 
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appealed by neighbouring residents to the OMB (TLAB if in the City of Toronto). Collectively, 
the neighbourhood residents may have more resources than the individual owner to put a 
compelling case together. Furthermore, access to financial resources also is an influencing factor 
on whether the public ‘fully participates’ or not, as defined by the OMB. Due to the disparity and 
importance of access to resources at the OMB, it receives an unsatisfactory grade for equity. 
 Diversity 
 Diversity in Fainstein’s Just City refers to both diversity of people and the built 
environment, however, for the purpose of this paper and its focus on public participation, the 
diversity of public participants and expressions of the public interest has been examined as it 
relates to OMB proceedings. A lot of what is often referred to as a public participant at the OMB 
are comprised of either neighbouring residents, neighbourhood associations or a combination of 
both. Although the makeup of these neighbourhood associations have become more diverse over 
time, they are still predominantly white upper middle class (Kipfer & Keil 2002).  Furthermore, 
“these associations are composed primarily of home owners as opposed to renters, whose 
interests…lie both in the use and exchange value of their own property” (Moore 2013, 57). 
 Some of the interviewees acknowledge that there exists a level of discrepancy in 
participation at the OMB based on both geography and affluence. A senior member of a 
neighbourhood association, in speaking about their association’s annual $13,000 budget for land 
use planning related matters, compared their resources to other “financially gifted” associations in 
neighbourhoods like Forest Hill and Rosedale (Public Interviewee 2). They also shared that what 
these more affluent associations spend on a single case before the OMB, is often close to, if not 
more, than ten times their own annual budget.  
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 Like most hurdles to public participation in any forum, factors such as time, education, 
culture, language and a variety of other variables can play a big role in the diversity of public 
participants at the OMB. The length and time of day that hearings play out means it is more 
accessible to those who are either retired are those who are in a position to take time off of work. 
Furthermore, OMB proceedings are legal processes that operate in a language that inaccessible to 
those who don’t have a strong command of the English language. Cultural differences and 
unfamiliarity with legal formalities may also impact one’s decision to partake in such a spectacle. 
One interviewee, who is retired and actively involved in their neighbourhood association echoes 
the difficulties in attracting a diverse range of faces and voices to be active (Public Interviewee 4). 
In preparation of their appeal of a development application – which will be discussed in the next 
chapter – Public Interviewee 4 made countless efforts, through community meetings, potlucks, and 
fundraising, to have a diverse set of residents come out and be represented in the association. 
Despite these efforts, the interviewee admits that the active residents are predominantly older white 
women. They speculate that cultural differences and the personal commitments of young families 
could have been factors in the lack of diversity.  
 More important than the diversity in the physical appearance and representation of public 
participants at the OMB is the diversity in the expressions of the public interest. If the public 
participants are predominantly older, white, and upper middle-class homeowners, how diverse of 
an expression of the public interest are they offering? Who, at the OMB, is advocating or providing 
a version of the public interest that accounts for those without a voice and are unheard? Valiante 
argues that the way in which the OMB makes its decisions, any unrepresented or unheard voice 
remains that way: 
“The structure of the legislated appeal process itself influences which expressions of 
the public interest even get presented to the Board. The OMB bases its decisions on 
the evidence before it. If an issue is not raised at all, or is raised but there is little or 
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no evidence supporting the interest, or if a group with a particular interest, such as 
tenants or youth, is not represented in the hearing, then the issue or interest could be 
downplayed or neglected” (Valiante 2016, 120). 
 
This problem with diversity in public participants may be a societal issue that is greater and 
transcends further than what happens at the OMB. While it is that true that the OMB can only hear 
from participants who wish to participate, its failure to have a mechanism to account for diverse 
expressions of the public hinders its ability to truly apply the criteria of good planning and the 
public interest in coming to its decision. For these reason, the OMB is assessed an unsatisfactory 
grade for diversity. 
 
Summary of the OMB 
 In this chapter, we explored how the OMB defines good planning through its reliance on 
planning policy and generally accepted principles within the professional planning community. 
We also navigated how the OMB distinguishes between participants who can ‘fully participate’ 
and represented and those who are reduced to a more limited role and are without representation. 
When these notions of good planning and public participation were examined under the lenses of 
urban justice, we found that the OMB passes the democracy test for not having any physical 
barriers for participation and its track record of accommodating unrepresented public participants 
in delivering their statements. Where the OMB fails is with the equity and diversity test. Full 
participation is heavily reliant on the resources available which often benefits those more affluent 
public participants in establishing their position as the expression of the public interest. Public 
participation at the OMB is unable to pass the criteria for good planning based on urban justice 
because the inequalities in the process fail to benefit the least advantaged participants the most. In 
the following chapter, we apply the same analysis to the OMB’s successor, LPAT. 
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Chapter 4 – LPAT – Bill 139 (2018-2019) 
The OMB and its various iterations, survived over 100 years, countless changes in 
government, and endless calls for its reform or abolishment. It was not until the final year of the 
Liberal government of Kathleen Wynne, in 2018, that the OMB finally met its fate, for much of 
the reasons discussed in the previous chapters. LPAT, however, would have a miniscule life in 
comparison with its predecessor. This latest demise will be covered in more detail in Chapter 5.  
Nevertheless, an examination of LPAT in theory and in practice, however limited, can contribute 
to an understanding as to the potential that such a land use planning appeal system could have on 
public participation and good planning. 
Reformation of the OMB came by way of Bill 139, the Building Better Communities and 
Conserving Watersheds Act, introduced by the Liberal minister Bill Mauro for its first reading on 
May 30, 2017, at Queens Park. At that first reading, Mr. Mauro described that, if passed, the Act 
would “replace the Ontario Municipal Board with the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal. The new 
tribunal would give greater weight to the decisions of local communities” (2017, May 30, 4687). 
The Act would also create a support centre, which was described by the Attorney General, Yasir 
Naqvi, as a means to: 
“empower and support people who want to participate in the appeal process. This 
will be done by establishing a new independent agency called the Local Planning 
Appeal Support Centre. This centre will help ensure that the views of local 
communities are taken into account when major decisions are made…[and] help 
Ontarians understand and participate more effectively in the appeal process by 
providing general information about land use planning to residents, offering 
guidance to residents on the tribunal process, and providing legal and planning 
advice at various stages of the appeal process, which may include representation in 
some cases as well” (Naqvi 2017, Sep 11, 4856). 
 
The conception of the Bill followed a review of the OMB and public consultation that began in 
the spring of 2016. The consultation consisted of 12 town hall meetings across Ontario that were 
attended by more than 700 people, 1,100 written submissions, and a consultation paper produced 
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by the Attorney General’s office (Mauro 2017, Sep 11). Based on the concerns received, covered 
in the previous chapters, it was apparent to the Liberal government that improvements needed to 
be made to prioritize local decision making and improve participation. The Bill was debated over 
10 sittings and 2 readings before receiving Royal Assent on December 12, 2017 with an effective 
start date of April 3, 2018. 
 Bill 139 brought forward many changes to how land use planning appeals would operate 
procedurally. These changes include, among others, the grounds for appeals, hearing types, 
number of possible hearings, evidentiary rules, timeline for appeals, assistance for participants, 
and requirements for obtaining status. As will be discussed in the following section, these 
differences have varying degrees of impact for public participation and good planning. Table 1 
below summarizes the key procedural differences between the OMB, LPAT under Bill 139, and 
LPAT under Bill 108 – the latter of which will be covered in Chapter 5. Again, this isn’t a complete 
set of changes enacted or proposed by the respective Bills, but a selection of the key differences 
that have the most impact to public participation and good planning: 
COMPARISON OF PARTICIPATORY FEATURES 
Participatory 
Features 
OMB LPAT (Bill 139) LPAT (Bill 108)* 
Grounds for 
Appeal ‘Good Planning’ 
Consistency & Conformity Test – 
applied to: (1) the decision or non-
decision or council; and (2) the proposed 
development. 
‘Good Planning’ 
Hearing Type Oral hearings Written hearings Oral hearings 
Number of 
Hearings 1 
Up to 2 (if the first decision is made 
against the approval authority) 1 
Evidentiary Rules De Novo 
First hearing: Review of only items 
available to City Council during their 
decision or non-decision 
Second hearing: De Novo 
De Novo 
Leading of 
evidence Legal counsel for each party The Tribunal 
Legal counsel for 
each party 
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Procedural Rules 
Cross-examination of 
witnesses/participants 
permitted. 
No cross-examination. Only the Tribunal 
can ask questions of 
witnesses/participants. 
Cross-examination of 
witnesses/participants 
permitted. 
Deference to 
Local Planning 
Shall have ‘regards’ to local 
planning decisions 
Application is sent back to City Council 
for reconsideration if the Tribunal makes 
a finding against it, at the first hearing 
Shall have ‘regards’ 
to local planning 
decisions 
Public Assistance Citizen Liaison Office – OMB in-house support 
Local Planning Appeal Support Centre – 
Independent from LPAT None 
Timeframe for 
Municipal 
Decisions before 
Appealable 
180 Days (OPA) 
120 Days (ZBA) 
210 Days (Official Plan) 
150 Days (Zoning By-law) 
120 Days (OPA) 
90 Days (ZBA) 
Participant Status 
Requirement None 
Participant Statement dealing with the 
Consistency & Conformity tests, due 30 
days before the scheduled CMC 
None 
Mediation 
Consideration Optional Mandatory Optional 
Timeline for 
Board/Tribunal to 
make render a 
decision 
None 6/10/12 months, depending on the type of appeal. None 
Table 1: Comparison of Participatory Features 
*Based on the information available at the time of writing 
 
For the purpose of this paper, LPAT will be considered in its entirety, as proposed in form 
and in substance by the Bill 139 features outlined in the table above. This assumes that LPAT and 
the Local Planning Appeal Support Centre (LPASC) are mutually dependent on one another. That 
is, one cannot exist without the other, despite the fact that the closure of LPASC came before 
LPAT’s imminent demise.  
 
LPAT and Good Planning 
The new grounds for appeal under the LPAT helped alter the meaning, if ever so slightly, of what 
constitutes good planning in land use planning appeals in Ontario. Section 22 subsection (7) of the 
Planning Act stipulates that the decision or non-decision of city council can only be appealed if it 
the appellant is able to meet two conditions. First, the appellant must demonstrate that the existing 
municipal policies in which a development is proposing to amend does not conform or is 
inconsistent with provincial policies. Second, they must then be able to demonstrate that their 
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proposed development remedies the inconsistency and inconformity that was identified under the 
first condition.  This essentially sets the bar higher and gives more deference to municipal policies 
allowing appeals to proceed only in instances where the appellant can demonstrate that municipal 
policies, specifically the Official Plan, does not conform or is inconsistent with provincial planning 
instruments. An excerpt of section 22(7) of Planning Act is below: 
 Appeal to L.P.A.T. 
 (7) When a person or public body requests an amendment to the official plan of a 
municipality or planning board, any of the following may appeal to the Tribunal in respect 
of all or any part of the requested amendment, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk 
of the municipality or the secretary-treasurer of the planning board, if one of the 
conditions set out in subsection (7.0.2) is met: 
1.  The person or public body that requested the amendment. 
2.  The Minister. 
3.  The appropriate approval authority.  2006, c. 23, s. 11 (5); 2017, c. 23, Sched. 5, s. 80. 
 
Basis for appeal 
(7.0.0.1) An appeal under subsection (7) may only be made on the basis that, 
 
(a) the existing part or parts of the official plan that would be affected by the requested 
amendment are inconsistent with a policy statement issued under subsection 3 (1), fail to 
conform with or conflict with a provincial plan or, in the case of the official plan of a 
lower-tier municipality, fail to conform with the upper-tier municipality’s official plan;  
 
and 
 
(b)  the requested amendment is consistent with policy statements issued under subsection 
3 (1), conforms with or does not conflict with provincial plans and, in the case of a 
requested amendment to the official plan of a lower-tier municipality, conforms with the 
upper-tier municipality’s official plan. 2017, c. 23, Sched. 3, s. 8 (3). 
 
 
Under the former OMB system, the ‘basis for appeal’ was simply a decision or non-
decision by council. The duty of the OMB was to determine which position advanced by the parties 
represented a better iteration of good planning, while applying provincial and municipal planning 
instruments and what it called “generally accepted tenets of good planning principles within the 
planning profession” (Howden 2017, 56). Under LPAT, however, the duty of the members was 
restricted to applying the test of consistency and conformity against existing legislative planning 
instruments. Essentially, good planning is now defined by only the hierarchy of existing planning 
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instruments available to the Tribunal. If the Tribunal finds that a decision or non-decision of 
council on an application failed to meet any, or all of the consistency and conformity tests, the 
Tribunal can no longer substitute council’s decision with its own. Instead, it must send the matter 
at hand back to the approval authority – often city council – for reconsideration on the first go 
around. It is important to note that this ‘second chance’ is extended only to the approval authority 
and not the applicant or third-party appellant. Only when the Tribunal finds that the decision or 
non-decision of council on reconsideration also fails to meet any or all of the consistency and 
conformity tests, can the Tribunal then substitute the decision or non-decision of council with its 
own in a similar fashion as under the old OMB system. 
 While it can be argued that sending a development application after the initial LPAT 
finding, back to the city council shows deference to the local approval authority and their 
jurisdiction over local planning matters, it should also be noted that the new tests puts a greater 
emphasis on provincial policy and plans than before (Industry Interviewee 4).  If the test is now 
simply consistency and conformity to planning instruments, it only makes sense that instruments 
situated at the top of the hierarchy is what prevails. In Ontario, a top down planning approach 
results into provincial statements and policies containing more weight than policies of its 
municipality. This is enshrined in both the Constitution Act of 1867 but also set out in the following 
excerpts of the Planning Act: 
 Policy statements 
 3 (1) The Minister, or the Minister together with any other minister of the Crown, may 
from time to time issue policy statements that have been approved by the Lieutenant 
Governor in Council on matters relating to municipal planning that in the opinion of the 
Minister are of provincial interest.  R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, s. 3 (1). 
 
Policy statements and provincial plans 
 (5) A decision of the council of a municipality, a local board, a planning board, a minister 
of the Crown and a ministry, board, commission or agency of the government, including 
the Tribunal, in respect of the exercise of any authority that affects a planning matter,  
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(a) shall be consistent with the policy statements issued under subsection (1) that are in 
effect on the date of the decision; and 
(b) shall conform with the provincial plans that are in effect on that date, or shall not 
conflict with them, as the case may be.  2006, c. 23, s. 5; 2017, c. 23, Sched. 5, s. 80. 
 
As a result, all decisions, whether it be a decision of city council or the LPAT itself, must be 
consistent to provincial policy statements and provincial plans. No considerable deference is given 
to municipalities other than having ‘regards to’ both municipal decisions and the materials that 
were available to council in making their decision. The latter of which will be discussed in greater 
detail in the following section. 
 
LPAT and Public Participation 
 While the distinction between the legal statuses of parties and participants haven’t change 
under LPAT, their obligations and roles have changed considerably. The ‘basis for appeal’ set out 
in the Planning Act – s.22(7) for OPAs and s.34(11) for ZBAs – puts a wrinkle into public 
participation in land use planning appeals in Ontario that did not formerly exist under the OMB. 
First, its narrows the issues that can be appealable to the Tribunal and second, it puts a greater 
emphasis on provincial statements and policies that many public participants may not be familiar 
with. More often than not, public participants have more familiarity with the local policies – 
Official Plan, Secondary Plans, Zoning By-laws – since they have a greater impact on them than 
statements and policies of the province. What compounds this difficulty even further are the 
clauses in the LPAT Rules of Practice and Procedure which lay out the requirements for 
participation for anyone that isn’t the appellant or approval authority: 
26.19 Participation in the Case Management Conference A person other than the 
Appellant, the municipality or approval authority who wishes to participate in an appeal 
initiated under subsections 17(24), 17(36), 17(40) 22(7), 34 (11), 34(19) or 51(34) of the 
Planning Act must file a written submission with the Registrar, at least 30 days before the 
date of the case management conference, and that submission shall explain the nature of 
their interest in the matter and how their participation will assist the Tribunal in 
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determining the issues in the proceeding. In addition, a person shall explain whether the 
decision or non-decision of the municipality or approval authority was inconsistent with 
a policy statement under subsection 3(1) of the Planning Act, fails to conform with or 
conflicts with a provincial plan, or fails to conform with an applicable official plan. Any 
submission shall also be provided to the municipality or to the approval authority whose 
decision or failure to make a decision is appealed and a certificate of service shall be filed 
with the Registrar to confirm service of any submission (LPAT Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 2018, 35). 
 
Section 26.19 above essentially sets out what I call the 3 tests of participation at LPAT, 
which include: 
 
1. Participants must explain what interest they have in the matter being appeal; 
2. Participants must also demonstrate how their participation, if granted, would help 
the Tribunal in making its decision; 
3. Participants must explain how the decision or non-decision of city council is: 
a. Inconsistent with a provincial policy statement; OR 
b. Does not conform with provincial plan; OR 
c. Does not confirm with an Official Plan. 
 
While it’s conceivable that public participants who wish to appeal a decision of city council 
in approval of a development application should be subject to a higher standard of appeal 
requirements, section 26.19 of the Rules of Practice and Procedures extends this requirement to 
everyone else that want to participate in a process that was initially appealed by someone else. No 
longer can public participants simply show up on the day of a hearing and make whatever statement 
that they see fit, they must now provide a written statement within a prescribed amount of time. 
Furthermore, their statement must address the 3 tests of participation at LPAT set out above. While 
the first two tests are conceivably straightforward, the third test deal with consistency and 
conformity to various planning instruments which are significant departure from the ‘anything 
goes’ public participation under the OMB. 
When presented with the excerpt of section 26.19 of the LPAT Rules of Practice and 
Procedure and asked for their opinion, one active resident and former manager of planning 
responded, “So in fact you have to be a planner. This is very onerous for participants” (Public 
Interviewee 1). Another active resident expressed a stronger distaste for the requirement: 
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 “This is pretty hardcore to me as a schmuck on the street. When you get into [the 
consistency and conformity test], this is a matter for subject matter experts. That's 
pretty harsh to ask for that. That's not my job. This is a way to disenfranchise 
participation. Language like this is pushing the community out of the process. I'm 
not sure how some people will participate” (Public Interviewee 3). 
 
Similar sentiments were shared by the both the private and public-sector lawyers interviewed. The 
private sector lawyer commented that: 
“It's challenging because you're requesting third parties to be very familiar with not 
only the legislation but also be familiar with these provincial policies, which…I think 
can only be provided by professional planners. I don't think that as a lay person, 
myself included, I am able to say that something conforms or is inconsistent with 
provincial policies without having a planning degree and going and being a 
professional planner. The intent of Bill 139 was to give a greater voice to public 
participation and respect local decision making. Well, for those third parties who 
have an interest in those types of appeals, I think their rights have actually been taken 
away” (Industry Interviewee 3). 
 
As for the public lawyer, they expressed the legal and technical nature of the requirement: 
 
“These tests can be quite complicated to understand. There are lot of nuances. You 
really need to know the policies. You need to like deeply dive into the Provincial 
Policy Statement, the Growth Plan, the Official Plan and the Planning Act for that 
matter. You have to also understand the distinction between [the] tests of consistency 
and conformity, which is a legal test under the Planning Act. They have long 
standing legal interpretations as to what those means. Members of the public may 
not appreciate it because it's not their role to appreciate the distinction between those 
[two tests]. The bar that's being set here for the test…requires a technical expertise 
to interpret. So, what that potentially tells me is that if these legal tests, which require 
interpretation of planning policies, are the criteria upon which the decision of 
councils are to be looked, then the weight of expert opinion evidence who have the 
expertise to interpret those same policies is going to be weighed quite heavily. So 
the public interest components where the input of residents and participants would 
normally be incorporated into [a decision] doesn't really fit squarely within the test I 
think. Because you are now looking at the decision of council, it becomes much more 
of a technical consideration” (Industry Interviewee 4).  
 
 Surprisingly, both the private and public planners interviewed shared a different opinion 
than the interviewees above. The public planner believed that these requirements didn’t necessarily 
hinder public participation in the LPAT process, but “if anything, it improves it” (Industry 
Interviewee 2). What was also surprising was that the public planner suggested that the public 
notices that were sent out to residents to inform them about participating at LPAT was a greater 
 
 
 
39 
hindrance because of the legalese that they contained (Ibid). This is contrary to the position from 
both public and private sectors lawyers who characterized the LPAT requirements for public 
participants as extraordinarily legal. If the legal language in which these public notices are a 
hindrance to public participation at LPAT, one can only imagine the difficulty and deterrence of 
“appreciating” and “distinguishing” between legal tests (Industry Interviewee 4). The private 
sector planner gave a longer explanation as to why they believed more stringent requirements on 
public participants would improve public participation: 
 “I would think a good participant is very familiar with policy because at the end 
of the day, it's the consistency or conformity to the policy that determines the 
application to a great extent. So to have a participant frame their comments in the 
context of policy, I would think that would only make them more effective and more 
informed sounding. Now it takes more work to do that. They can't just speak off the 
top of their head. So this…places a greater onus on the participant to be informed of 
what the policy context is. I would think even under a system of good planning, they 
should do that, right? If they want to be effective. It would improve the quality of 
participation. I don't want to necessarily impose this on the participants. But if I was 
advising participants, I would say to them that they should frame their comments in 
reference to policies so that there's a context within which the LPAT member can 
consider their comments” (Industry Interviewee 1). 
 
While the private planner acknowledged that the new requirements presented a “greater onus” than 
that of the OMB, their position that it was within a role of a good participant to not only familiarize 
themselves with policy but also frame their comments within policy comes contrary to the opinions 
of both the residents and lawyers interviewed that this was the role of an expert planner. One can 
only speculate that these positions advanced by the professional planners interviewed were based, 
in part, on their preference of speaking the ‘planning language’. This sentiment will be further 
explored in the section pertaining to the LPASC. 
Unlike the flexibility that was afforded public participants in either receiving status or 
providing a statement, even up to the day of hearing, the private lawyer interviewed alerted that 
no such leeway exists under LPAT: 
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“Under [LPAT], you have to be very familiar with the rules. You can't show up to a 
case management conference and say, I have an issue. First of all, you have to file a 
request for party status 30 days before the Case Management Conference, which 
most parties won't know about…if you don't make that request, the Tribunal, no 
matter how sympathetic they may be to your cause[,] doesn't have the jurisdiction to 
give you party status because you didn't make it within the 30 days” (Industry 
Interviewee 3). 
 
Of the half dozen Case Management Conferences (CMC) that I attended for this paper, there was 
one case where status was denied because the participant did not provide the proper notice within 
the prescribed time and another case where the participant was questioned on their eligibility to 
receive party status. The latter matter dealt with an adjacent neighbour to a proposed development 
that was being appealed to LPAT by the developer after city council refused the application. What 
is pertinent to this discussion is that the neighbour, who was originally unrepresented, submitted a 
statement which did not deal with the tests set out in section 26.19 of the LPAT Rules of Practice 
and Procedure. At the CMC, even though receiving the consent of the other parties (appellant and 
approval authority) to be a party to the proceeding, the Tribunal took the neighbour, who was now 
represented by legal counsel, step by step through each and every one of the 3 part test. Only when 
the neighbour, through their legal counsel, was able to satisfy the Tribunal member that they met 
each and every one of those tests, were they granted party status. This case demonstrates two 
things. First, with the benefit of legal counsel, the participant was able to satisfy legal tests that it 
was unable to do so on its own. Second, it also demonstrates the limited leeway, if any, that public 
participants can face just trying to get their foot into the LPAT door. 
   
Written Hearings 
Another component of LPAT that the interviewees didn’t have a consensus on is the impact 
that hearings based on written submissions, as opposed to oral submissions, have on public 
participation. Under LPAT, hearings are limited to written submissions unless the Tribunal 
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member, in its discretion, calls for oral testimony. In my attendance at a half dozen CMCs, the 
Tribunal member has asked, in all cases, for the attendance of only the expert planners of the 
parties for oral testimony. Unlike the OMB’s adversarial system where questioning and cross 
examinations would be led by the legal counsel of each party, under LPAT, all questions during 
oral examination will be led by the Tribunal member. Furthermore, parties will not have an 
opportunity to cross examine anyone that is questioned by the Tribunal. This prohibition of cross-
examination under Bill 139 was reinforced by a Divisional Court decision on May 16, 2019 which 
will be further examined in the following section. 
Public Interviewees who were asked to provide an opinion on predominantly written based 
hearings were generally receptive to the idea. The retired planner and now active resident opined 
that it is: 
“Easier to think on paper than on your feet. Giving oral evidence is stressful. The 
adversarial court like atmosphere of the OMB is very intimidating. Public 
[participants] can be emotional. They are less likely to write emotional things than 
to say them. They can prepare in a less stressful environment with assistance from 
others or even put together a joint statement” (Public Interviewee 1). 
 
Another active resident echoed this collaborate element of written submissions and also touched 
upon having to adjust their statements on the fly based on the oral statements of other participants, 
and the challenges of dealing with cross examination at the OMB: 
“For some people they will be more comfortable. It’s an opportunity for team 
writing. Use to have to paraphrase statements based on what other people would 
have said during the hearing. I used to watch some of our city planners who were 
subject matter experts who really died on the stand. Having the member control the 
narrative is much healthier. Forces me to get organized earlier. Some lawyers are so 
skilled in the theatre of cross examination” (Public Interviewee 2). 
 
A third resident advised that they were more comfortable writing than public speaking, however, 
believed that it was more a matter of individual preference (Public Interviewee 5). While the 
Industry Interviewees could conceive its benefits, they also identified factors that could make 
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written submissions more difficult for public participants. First, public participants must review 
and understand all relevant provincial statements and policies, municipal policies and the 
development application. While most of this information is public record, accessing it may be 
challenging the for general public (Industry Interviewee 2). For instance, the City of Toronto has 
a comprehensive Application Information Centre online where residents can obtain all the latest 
documents pertaining to a development application, but that type of system is not readily available 
in most municipalities (Ibid). Furthermore, public participants who may wish to review the 
materials and statements of other participant or parties in preparation of the own statement may 
run into some roadblocks trying to access information at LPAT. In conducting research for this 
paper, several files were required to be ordered in advanced. Physical attendance was required at 
the LPAT office in downtown Toronto to review the files, and photocopies came at a cost. Not all 
files were readily available because some files, depending on the stage of the proceedings, were in 
the possession of the member that was assigned to the matter. Second, the challenges in compiling 
all of this information amplifies the difficulty in meeting the strict deadline imposed but the 
aforementioned LPAT Rules of Practice and Procedure (section 26.19).  Appendix C is a copy of 
the requirements for the Appellant to give public notice of the appeal and pending CMC hearing. 
Appendix D is an example of the resulting notice that the public receives. The latter of which is 
what concerned the municipal planner, who advised that many public participants called city 
planning staff and their councillors and commented that they did not understand the notice and 
what they were required to do in order to participate (Industry Interviewee 2).  
If appellants are required to give public notice 75 days in advance of a scheduled CMC and 
public participants are required to submit their statement 30 days in advance of the CMC, it is a 
strong possibility that the public is only afforded 35 days to prepare and submit their statement 
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from the time they receive the notice. All of the Industry Interviewees believed the timing was 
reasonable, despite some – both public and private lawyers – commenting about the complex and 
legal tests that were required to be addressed in the submissions. This is an underestimation of the 
time and effort required to not only assemble information that may not be readily available, but 
also to review, digest, and rearticulate the information in a competent manner within a strict 
timeframe. The allowance of 35 days – or more depending on the appellants appetite for giving 
notice at the earliest available time – may seem reasonable for those who earn a living dealing with 
the consistency and conformity tests of various planning instruments, however, for a public 
participant with full time employment and other obligations, it may not seem as reasonable to 
them. 
 
De Novo 
 The departure of de novo hearings means that the Tribunal can no longer run a clean slate 
hearing where they can hear whatever evidence the parties wish to submit in order to advance their 
case. Bill 139 has restricted the Tribunal to more of an appellate body which reviews decisions (or 
non-decisions) by the municipal approval authority, rather than just having regards to local 
decisions while applying their own criteria for good planning and public interest (Industry 
Interviewee 3). One of the main rationales provided by the legislature for this change was that it 
would reduce the time and costs of hearing and provide greater deference to local decision making 
(Mauro 2017, Sep 11). Parties no longer can bring their entire arsenal of expert evidence and 
witnesses, examining and cross examining them one by one. Combined with the requirement for 
written submissions, all of the information was required to be provided upfront in a consolidated 
collection of materials called the Enhanced Municipal Record (EMR). The local municipality was 
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responsible for compiling the EMR with all the materials that was available to city council when 
or if they made their decision. The rules, reinforced by a decision of Division Court, stipulate that 
the EMR is closed as of the moment that city council makes its decision or when the prescribed 
time for council to make a decision lapses. Since LPAT can only consider evidence contained 
within the EMR that was available for council to make its decision, no party can introduce new 
evidence – by way of experts or otherwise – unless the Tribunal finds that additional information 
would assist it in reaching a decision. Barring this determination of the Tribunal, Bill 139 
effectively frontloads the time, effort, and resources that must go into compiling the EMR earlier 
in the process, even without the knowledge of whether a matter will require an appeal or not. These 
changes have both positive and negative implications for public participation. 
The implication for public participation is that the entire development application, and all 
of the applicant’s justification for it, that was considered before council is the exact same 
development application and justification that will be addressed by the LPAT. This is significant 
because under the de novo system of the OMB, the clean slate hearing allowed the appellants to 
bring a modified version of a proposed development to the hearing. Developers were also able to 
submit less than ideal applications with limited effort and resources, expecting the matter to go to 
an appeal, and then commit the effort and resources into bringing a more reasonable application 
to the Board. Some Public Interviewees expressed that this often caught them off guard and made 
some, if not all, of their preparation moot. One person expressed that consistency was important 
for the public to be able to digest and form an opinion (Public Interviewee 1). 
As for the disadvantages of moving away from de novo hearings, the private planner 
interviewed expressed that front loading the requirements for public participants was unnecessarily 
burdening them: 
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“I think [front loading] cuts [the public] out. More reliance on affidavit of experts. 
I'm not so sure that a participant should have to work so hard. It's not their life's work 
to do this. They just want to have input. So on one hand you'd want their input to be 
as informed as possible so that they can provide effective comments, not irrelevant 
comments and on the other hand, are you going to make them work so hard that 
they've got a second job simply to participate in the planning process? And I don't 
think that's necessary. I think that de novo hearings will enable them to come to the 
hearing and just state what their comments are and it's incumbent upon them to make 
their comments as effective as possible” (Industry Interviewee 1). 
 
This planner opined that the former OMB system allowed public participants to participate, for the 
most part, in any way they saw fit. Another point that was brought up was that public participants 
typically wait for city council to make a decision on matters before determining to what extent 
they will participate, if at all (Public Interviewee 1; Public Interviewee 2). Generally, when city 
council’s decision aligns with the position of the residents, the public would generally only take a 
passive role in participating in land use planning appeals because it is the expectation that the city 
would, through their legal counsel and experts, oppose the appeal in a manner that would be more 
effective than the general public. Under these circumstances, the public may only seek participant 
status to simply provide their statements. Under LPAT, however, the requirement is that all expert 
evidence must be available for council consideration in order for it to be used at a potential future 
appeal before LPAT. What this does is force members of the public, who may want to seek party 
status at a potential future appeal, to consider hiring expert consultants without the benefit of 
knowing how council will decide on a particular application. It also forces the public to assume 
that an appeal is imminent. Concerns about this was voiced by the Public Interviewee 1 and echoed 
by Public Interviewee 2 and Industry Interviewee 3: 
“[It] will hinder public participation if [the public] can't wait for council's decision 
before investing their own time and money.  Very rare for public to hire a planner. 
That’s what City's planning staff is for. If they can't assemble a case, that's unfair. 
Before council makes a decision, nobody can predict what [their] decision is and if 
will be appealed” (Public Interviewee 1). 
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Local Planning Appeal Support Centre 
 Although the preceding sections on LPAT paint a bleak picture for public participation in 
the new land use planning appeals regime, the silver lining in Bill 139 is establishment of the Local 
Planning Appeal Support Centre. The LPASC, a body independent from the LPAT itself, was 
meant to replace the little-known Citizen Liaison Office, which was established in 2016 under the 
former OMB system and was an in-house group that provided general procedural information on 
matters at the Board, without representation (Tang & Lasage 2019). Bill 139 contemplated a 
centre, consisting of both development lawyers and professional planners, that would respond to 
inquiries for the general public and, where it found fit, provide free legal counsel and planning 
experts to represent public participants. The mandate of LPASC is to “help people participate 
meaningfully, reduce cost and number of appeals, support good decision making, and planning 
outcomes in-line with provincial and local policies” (Presentation – June 21, 2018). The table 
below is a summary of the services that the Centre offered to public participants prior to and after 
a decision had been made by their local council: 
Local Planning Appeal Support Centre Services 
Pre-municipal decision Post-municipal decision 
Helping people understand: 
• The proposal • The appeal process (timelines, requirements) 
• The policy framework (provincial and municipal 
plans) 
• How to fill out appeal forms 
• How to frame their concerns in land use planning 
terms 
• How to prepare the appeal record, case synopsis, 
documents and submissions 
• How to engage in early engagement and resolution • How to get ready for case management 
conferences, mediation and hearings 
• How to make a submission at municipal council • How to file a motion 
Table 2: Local Planning Appeal Support Centres 
Source: LPASC Presentation June 21, 2018 – Peel Art Gallery, Museum and Archives 
 
The scope of the services provided by the LPASC covered most of the bases under the new 
planning regime brought by Bill 139. It addresses most, if not all, of the concerns raised about 
LPAT above, including meeting the applicable tests for parties and participants, being prepared to 
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make written submissions to council in order to contribute to the EMR, and participate in oral 
proceedings if applicable. 
Despite the expectation from the Liberal government that the Centre was to provide this 
wide range of services to residents all across Ontario, the government only provided the Centre 
with an annual budget of $1,500,000 and for a staff of 10, comprised of 2 planners, 2 lawyers and 
other support staff (Industry Interviewee 6). With this modest budget, the Centre was forced define 
different levels services that could be afforded to different categories of public participants. One 
staff member explained how the Centre categorized participants: 
“Our online resources and conversations with our staff were available to all, as it was 
our goal to assist everyone involved in the LPAT process. We determined that we 
would not provide our professional services, that is expert planning or legal services 
to a for profit planning application. We would give advice, and talk through things, 
but we would not prepare witness statements, or attend hearings, etc.  We determined 
that our assistance was intended to improve the overall land use approvals and appeal 
system so we did not set an income or client resource capacity in determining 
eligibility” (Industry Interviewee 6). 
 
In distinguishing between non-profit participants and for-profit participants, the LPASC 
essentially established its definition of public participant. This is very much in line with the way 
in which public participants was defined for the purposes of this paper. That is, third party 
participant without a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a land use planning appeal matters.  
While information and advice from the LPASC is extended to everyone, ‘public’ participants are 
eligible to be considered for representation but ‘private’ participants are not. 
In order to illustrate the impact that the LPASC had in public participation in land use 
planning appeals, interviews were conducted with three individuals with experience utilizing the 
Centre. In order to protect the anonymity of the interviewees, the details of the planning 
applications in which they were involved in have been generalized. 
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LPAT Case Study 1 - Negotiated settlement with LPASC 
Public Interviewees 3 and 4 were interviewed together as they were appellants for different 
components (ZBA and OPA) of the same matter. The application in which they appealed pertained 
to a proposed office tower located along a transit corridor in a city west of the Greater Toronto 
Area. The office tower would be accompanied by a multi-storey above grade parking garage 
structure. One of most contentious issues about the proposed development was the garage 
structure, which was considerably taller than the 1 ½ and 2 storey detached residential dwellings 
that were adjacent on two sides of the development. The garage was set back from the adjacent 
residential properties in manner in which one of the appellants described as “an arm’s length away” 
(Public Interviewee 4).  
After the development application was submitted, the municipal planner assigned to the 
file put together a staff report which recommended approval of the development, as described 
above, despite the various concerns voice by the community including the above grade garage 
structure and its setback relative to the surrounding residential uses. The recommendation of that 
staff report was later upheld by the decision of council, and the development proposal was 
approved. Long story short, Public Interviewee 3 and 4 each appealed a different component of 
application, enlisting the services of the LPASC, and were eventually able to reach a negotiated 
settlement with the developer. The settlement involved relocating the above grade parking garage 
structure underground, something the developer had always insisted was not economically 
feasible, and an increased setback between the office tower and the adjacent residential dwellings 
(Public Interviewee 3).  
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While neither interviewees had direct experience with the former OMB system, they 
advised that a big factor for their decision to actually go through with the appeal was that it was 
under the LPAT system and not the OMB: 
"If it were still the OMB, it wouldn't have happened. We weren't sure if this matter 
would be under OMB or LPAT, but when we heard it was under LPAT, we knew it 
was feasible. We were willing to test the system even if we failed, because we could 
minimize the cost of it. If we can't do it as independent citizens it would kind of 
prove that the system wasn't working, at least to me” (Public Interviewee 3). 
 
One of the appellants shared that they heard from one developer down the street who spent $40,000 
on a OMB appeal and lost, and another neighbourhood association that spent in excess of $100,000 
opposing a development at the OMB (Public Interviewee 4). Despite their own inexperience with 
the OMB, the narratives behind costs at the Board was a serious consideration as to whether they 
would proceed with an appeal or not. 
 One of the appellants is a professor at the school of planning at the local university. While 
not considering themselves a planner or having extensive knowledge with land use planning 
appeals, they credited conversations with fellow colleagues from the university that brought 
awareness to the existence of the LPASC (Public Interviewee 3). The co-appellants initial 
interaction with the LPASC consisted of advice on how to organize submissions for an appeal of 
the decision of council. The appellants drafted an appeal and sent it to a lawyer with the LPASC 
for review, comments and revisions. One of the appellants described the changes in which the 
LPASC lawyer made was foreign in the way that the arguments were organized and formatted, as 
well as foreign in the legalese that was used to reword their draft submissions (Ibid). Despite this 
initial assistance with drafting the appeal submissions, it wasn’t for a few months until the LPASC 
completed their vetting process, and advised that the Centre would be providing the co-appellants 
with legal and planning representation at LPAT. But there was one caveat. As a condition of 
providing representation, the LPASC required the co-appellants to hire an urban designer to 
 
 
 
50 
provide expert evidence to support the position which the Centre wanted to advance at LPAT 
(Public Interviewee 4). This illustrates the budgetary constraints that the LPASC has in terms of 
hiring experts itself. A staff member of the Centre commented that it only requests that public 
participants contribute in the hiring of outside experts as a last resort: 
“Individuals may be required to contribute to costs of technical experts if they are 
needed.  We considered how best to handle the need for expert testimony in our cases 
where the area of expertise would require a consulting professional. We determined 
that we would look at the nature of the issue and determine if there were already 
technical experts from the municipality, or other public body that had done a review 
that could provide the needed evidence, look to cross (if possible) of the applicants 
witness, and as a last resort, hire our own.  As we had a limited budget, we knew that 
we would not have the funds to hire professionals on a regular basis, so we would 
look to our client to fund the cost if required.  We did not set out an outright 
prohibition of hiring and paying for, and in our first year we only had one case that 
required evidence other than Land Use Planning, and in that case the client had an 
expert who prepared an affidavit in support of the case” (Industry Interviewee 6). 
 
In this particular case, since the development application was supported by city planning staff and 
approved by council, there wasn’t any existing expert opinion that the LPASC could rely on to 
oppose certain elements of the proposal. Furthermore, since the primary contested issue was an 
above grade parking garage structure, the additional expert evidence of urban designer would be 
essential for advancing a position about built form and built environment. 
Notwithstanding all the support from the Centre, the appellant, who is a retiree, estimates 
that they spent well over 1000 hours from when the first got involved in the development 
application, until a final settlement was reached (Public Interviewee 4). Between the various public 
meetings, neighbourhood association meetings, neighbourhood potlucks, preparation of appeals, 
fundraising and settlement negotiation, the retiree opined that this level of engagement would be 
difficult for those with a full-time job and children (Ibid). Their co-appellant chimed in and 
expressed that their level of involvement in this matter felt like a research project separate from 
their primary teaching job (Public Interviewee 3). While an active participatory role is always 
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encouraged, the LPASC has expressed that it is not necessarily required in order to obtain its 
services: “There was a clear expectation that the client was to be engaged to their level of 
comfort,  and as most of our work was advice that the clients then used to act for themselves, a 
high percentage was active in their cases” (Industry Interviewee 6). The terms and conditions for 
LPASC assistance is outlined in their Service Agreement which is attached to this paper as 
Appendix E. 
Reflecting on their experience with the LPASC, the retiree admits that the assistance and 
support of the Centre played a major role in their decision to go ahead with the appeal (Public 
Interviewee 4). Their co-appellant, on the other hand, believes that they may have gone ahead 
regardless, but would have required the efforts of their planning students to do so (Public 
Interviewee 3). In light of the closure of the LPASC, the co-appellants each shared why they 
believe the Centre is important for not only public participation but also land use planning as a 
whole. The retiree likened the LPASC to a filter, that sifts out NIMBYism from the planning 
process. Their co-appellant attributed the Centre with increasing the efficiency of planning appeals 
by helping participants focus on the issues and arguments that would help them achieve their 
objectives. 
This case is a perfect illustration of the benefits of not only having an opportunity to appeal 
the decision of council, but also receive the proper representation to put adequate pressure on city 
planning staff, city council and developers to not settle for an acceptable notion of good planning 
and public interest, but its best iteration. Although the appellants were required to hire an expert 
to support their case, the $5,000 that was fundraised to pay for it pales in comparison to the six 
figure numbers that we became accustomed to under the OMB.   
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LPAT Case Study 2 - Turned down by LPASC 
This next case deals with a high-rise mixed-use development located in the downtown area 
of a municipality that is also West of the Greater Toronto Area. The interviewee, also a retiree, is 
active in their community and has been involved in various heritage conservation efforts over the 
years (Public Interviewee 5). The development application proposed to demolish an existing 
building which had heritage attributes but was neither listed or designated on the heritage registry. 
The proposal was supported by city planning staff and subsequently approved by city council. 
Based on their history with involvement in heritage conservation matters, they received a 
lot of support and encouragement from their neighbours to appeal, however, no one was willing to 
either significantly financially support the appeal or make an initiative to fundraise for it (Ibid). 
After reading in the news about the success that Public Interviewee 3 and 4 had with the LPASC, 
they decided to get in touch with the LPASC. The Centre’s involvement started off in a similar 
fashion to the previous case, whereby the potential appellant would put together a draft of the 
issues that justified an appeal. In this case, however, upon review of the draft submissions, Public 
Interviewee 5 was advised by the LPASC that it was not able to provide assistance on the appeal 
as it was not something they can “argue strictly on the planning merits” (Ibid). Despite not being 
able to commit legal and planning representation to this matter, the LPASC didn’t just abandon 
the interviewee. Instead, the Centre continued to provide Public Interviewee 5 with helpful advice 
on how to strengthen their case if they wished to proceed with the appeal anyway (Ibid). Looking 
back, the interviewee commented that the LPASC played a “huge role” in their decision to not go 
ahead with an appeal. When asked whether they felt that the LPASC is important for public 
participation, despite the Centre influencing against participating in this particular instance, 
without any hesitation they exclaimed “oh god yeah!” (Ibid). 
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LPAT and the Just City 
The difficulty in providing a comprehensive Just City analysis of Bill 139’s version of LPAT is 
that there haven’t been enough matters that have gone through the entire process to have a rigorous 
sample size. The transition from a 112-year-old system was anything but seamless. Most contested 
matters appealed to LPAT have been on hold since the appeals of the Official Plan Amendment 
with respect to the rail deck park in downtown Toronto. At this very first CMC held by the Tribunal 
under LPAT on September 20, 2018, a three-member panel heard submissions and concerns from 
the parties that there was significant legal uncertainty as to the interpretation of LPAT procedures. 
Ultimately, the LPAT members decided to refer those questions of legal interpretation over to 
Divisional Court (Craft et al. v. City of Toronto et al, 2018). These issues pertained to rules about 
cross examination and production of additional evidence outside of the EMR. Divisional Court 
convened and did not render a decision until May 16, 2019 (Craft et al. v. City of Toronto et al, 
2019). Between the first CMC and the final decision of Divisional Court, all matters before LPAT 
were effectively postponed indefinitely unless they were either in settlement discussions or being 
dismissed. What compounded this mess even further was the fact that by the time Divisional Court 
had issued its decision, it was considered to effectively be moot because of the announcement of 
Bill 108 on May 2, 2019, which is the legislation that would eventually reform LPAT. 
As a result, a disclaimer must be made to the reader that the following analysis is based 
largely on the author’s interpretation of Bill 139, opinions expressed by the interviewees, and the 
limited sample size of cases that were available at the time of research. With the imminent arrival 
of Bill 108 and the uncertainty of how ‘legacy’ LPAT cases will be transitioned to the LPAT post 
Bill 108, there is serious doubt that a comprehensive analysis of Bill 139 is plausible in the 
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foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the following sections will attempt to initiate a discussion about 
LPAT (Bill 139) on elements of urban justice, a discussion that may never conclude. 
 
 Democracy 
 LPAT’s procedure of sending back applications to city council for reconsideration, after 
the first finding, can be seen as a step in the right direction for democracy. What it does is give 
elected representatives an opportunity to re-visit an application with not only their experts but also 
the public. While this has yet to occur in the limited history of LPAT, the municipal lawyer 
interviewed agreed that this would be an opportunity for further public engagement (Industry 
Interviewee 4). While this process may feel like a mandatory compromise for the public 
participants, it may give the impression that the land use planning appeals process is less arbitrary 
and top-down. This can be considered more democratic than an OMB system that puts the 
decision-making process in the hands of Board, with limited deference to the decisions of council 
and no opportunity for council and the general public to reconsider and compromise. 
 Where the OMB arguably has the edge on LPAT democratically is with respect to the 
accessibility of participation. The virtually non-existence participant requirement and leniency 
afforded by the legislation enabled public participants to participate in almost any way they saw 
fit. Democracy does not necessarily require that each vote carry the exact same weight, rather what 
is arguably more important for democracy is the ability to cast one’s vote if one chooses to do so. 
Does the fact that the existence of a support centre such as LPASC mitigate the tall order that 
participants have to overcome in addressing the tests of consistency and conformity? It may 
alleviate some of the challenges but may not eliminate the deterrence from outset. Without a more 
comprehensive and better funded Centre, the minor victory for representative democracy under 
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LPAT with the LPASC may be neutralized by a step back in direct participatory democracy. 
Nevertheless, unless there is a considerable change to culture of expertise entrenched into land use 
planning in Ontario, the form and substance of democracy contained within Bill 139 may be the 
lesser of two evils, when compared to the former OMB. 
 
 Equity 
Under the former OMB, material resources were paramount for acquiring the expertise that 
formed a significant portion of the Board’s criteria for determining good planning and the public 
interest. Non-material resources, such as support from civil servants like municipal planners and 
lawyers were limited to providing general information, that was often already publicly accessible 
(Industry Interviewee 2). The LPASC filled in a non-material gap under the OMB even with the 
existence of public planners and the Citizens Liaison Office. First, public planners, in theory, can 
only point the public in the direction of where to obtain the information they need to participate.  
Unlike, the LPASC, public planners cannot guide public participants on how to prepare and write 
their statements or submissions. This is because it neither in their job description to hold the publics 
hand in establishing their case or appropriate for them to influence the opinion of other participants 
because they are providing their own impartial expert opinion at an appeal (Public Interviewee 1; 
Industry Interviewee 2). Second, the Citizen Liaison Office is first and foremost, the legal and 
professional planning counsels to board members. This creates an inherent conflict between what 
advice they give board members and the extent that they can assist the public in providing evidence 
or statements before those very board members. 
The introduction of the LPASC also minimized the dependency on monetary resources. It 
can be argued that the reliance on the non-material services provided by the Centre was heightened 
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under Bill 139 because of the predefined consistency and conformity test that binds the Tribunal’s 
decision-making process. While the majority of interviewees acknowledge that the participatory 
tests under LPAT create a greater challenge for the general public to overcome, it could be argued 
that meeting those tests, with the guidance of the Centre, could go a long way in having public 
participant speak the language of the LPAT and contribute to more meaningful form of 
participation. By not imposing income or resource capacity requirements of participants and 
limiting the services available to ‘private’ participants, the LPASC is ensuring that the resources 
are available to those who need it most. A better funded and staffed Centre would enable better 
representation of those least advantaged, by provided them access to the require expert consultants 
without the requirement of monetary contributions in those circumstances where they are 
unaccounted for in government planning. Nevertheless, LPAT provides a welcome deviation away 
from the former OMB process where success was often tied to access to material resources.  
 
 Diversity 
 The shift away from oral hearings has the potential to invite a more diverse field of 
participants and perspectives to land use planning appeals. Under LPAT, public participants are 
generally not required to attend hearings in order have their opinions considered by the Tribunal. 
Limiting most appeals to written submissions enables the public to participate at a time and place 
that is comfortable and convenient for them. Shielding the unrepresented public from the 
adversarial duel between experts and legal practitioners can go a long way in making land use 
planning appeals a little more approachable to those who don’t fall within the mold of older, white, 
upper-middle class, and homeowner. It enables a wide range of residents from various 
neighbourhoods to contribute to the diversity in the expressions of the public interests. This ensures 
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the public interests are not dominated by those privileged by affluence and representation. LPASC 
takes the task of defining good planning and the public interest out of the hands of the Tribunal 
members and provides a forum for diverse expressions of the public interest to materialize through 
public participants. 
 
Summary of LPAT and Bill 139 
Although Bill 139 raised the requirements and difficulty for public participation in land 
use planning appeals, it was meant to be balanced with the help of the LPASC. Unfortunately, the 
limited budget that was set for the LPASC impaired its ability to perform its functions to its full 
potential. Despite the budgetary constraints, the LPASC was involved with, to various degrees, 
approximately 40% of all LPAT matters (Industry Interviewee 6). The Bill also shifted the 
responsibility of defining good planning from the members to existing policies that were open and 
transparent to everyone. It also gave deference to local decision making by giving them a second 
chance to consider and consult the public. For the reasons set out above, changes to land use 
planning appeals under LPAT represent a more democratic, equitable and diverse alternative to 
what was offered under the OMB. Notwithstanding its demise, a Bill 139 version of LPAT could 
conceivably decrease the quantity of public participation – by filtering out NIMBYism – while at 
the same increasing its quality. 
 
Chapter 5 – LPAT 2.0 – Bill 108 (2019) 
The Liberal government that introduced and enacted Bill 139 which replaced the OMB 
with LPAT was not around long enough to see the fruits of their labour. While LPAT was officially 
operational on April 3, 2018, the Liberal government lost the 2018 provincial election and was 
 
 
 
58 
replaced by a Conservative government led by Doug Ford on June 28, 2018. Almost immediately, 
there were rumblings in the planning community that something would happen to the newly 
established LPAT (Industry Interviewee 2; Industry Interviewee 3; Industry Interviewee 4). 
Consistent with Ford’s campaign motto of opening Ontario for business, his government almost 
immediately searched for ‘inefficiencies’ to accommodate for capital endeavours in the province.  
The first domino to fall for Bill 139 was at the end of February 2019 when the LPASC posted on 
its website that the Ontario government was closing the Centre and was giving it until June 30, 
2018 to wrap up its operation (Panico 2019). The Ford government neither announced or explained 
the closure themselves.  
The Ford government next announced its plan to reform LPAT through the tabling of Bill 
108 (More Homes, More Choices Act) on May 2, 2019. This is just over a year from when the 
LPAT regime, under Bill 139, first came into force an effect. Many of the changes proposed and 
eventually approved by Bill 108 consists of rolling back a considerable amount of the reforms 
brought by Bill 139. These rollbacks include the return of both oral and de novo hearings, the 
removal of the consistency and conformity tests for both LPAT members and participants, and the 
elimination of the LPASC, which I continue to argue are all part of the same initiative that was 
just executed on a different timeframe. All these rolled back elements will function in more or less 
the same manner in which it did at the OMB, and as such, does not warrant a re-analysis. 
One of the new changes that may have a significant impact on public participation in 
general is the changes to the time frame that municipalities have to make decisions on development 
applications. The timeframe under Bill 139 for which municipalities were required to make a 
decision on a development application was 210 days for an OPA and 150 days for a ZBA. Under 
Bill 108 the timeframes have been drastically reduced to 120 days and 90 days respectively. This 
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garnered a significant reaction from many of the Industry Interviewees, both public and private. 
The most pertinent reaction came from the Senior Planner with the City of Toronto, whose job it 
is to oversee and process development application. They dismissed the new timeframes as even 
being remotely possible: 
“It's totally impossible. There's no way. An average complex rezoning application is 
proposing 500 units in downtown Toronto. Applications can’t be brought forward 
for decision in 90 days. Typically at the 90 days you probably would have had the 
initial submission out for circulation to your commenting partners like engineering, 
urban design or urban forestry, and maybe TRCA or TTC and maybe you've 
scheduled the public consultation meeting. Of course the province cut the City 
Council in half, so they even have less time to go out to these public consultation 
meetings now. So that's always a bit of a difficult struggle…to find time with the 
local councillor to schedule the public meeting. With the reduced timeframes there 
may be many cases where only one public meeting or no public meetings will happen 
before an appeal is filed” (Industry Interviewee 2). 
 
So not only are public participants back to square one with respect to not having a support centre 
to navigate the complexities of land use planning matters, they now also have to contend with the 
prospect of have a reduction in the number of public meetings, if any at all, which they have 
historically used to gather information for their participation. They also have to deal with the 
prospect that staff will not have sufficient time to put together a Final Report with all the details 
that the general public normally rely on when putting together their participant statements (Public 
Interviewee 2). Instead, public planning staff my simply shift gears from processing an application 
to preparing for an appeal within a 90 day timeframe, leaving a considerable gap in information to 
the detriment of public participation in land use planning. Multiple interviewees predicted a 
considerable increase to the number of appeals based on the municipalities failure to make a 
decision (Industry Interviewee 1, 2, & 5). What this would conceivably do is increase the frequency 
in which public participants will need head back to a land use planning appeal process that they 
fought so hard to reform in the first place. At the conclusion of the research for this paper, Bill 108 
was still being read in the legislature. Its final and full form and content has yet to be seen. What 
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is clear, however, is that it represents an inferior form of public participation and good planning in 
land use planning appeals than even what was present before with the OMB. The full extent of the 
degradation to public participation and good planning will have to be seen, studied and analyzed 
in future endeavours. 
 
Conclusion 
We began by exploring the nuances of defining good planning and public participation. 
The former relied on Susan Fainstein’s Just City framework based on the principles of urban 
justice, which in turn, is comprised of the tensions and intersectionality of democracy, equity and 
diversity. The urban justice framework was relied upon to establish the latter, which is who is the 
public, in public participation within the context of land use planning appeals. We defined the 
public as third parties that do not have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of an appeal. 
Unrepresented public participants, in particular, are the least advantage of the participants, and as 
such should benefit the most from any inequalities produced from the process.  
We then explored the OMB and its procedures, measuring it up against the criteria of 
democracy, equity, and diversity. While receiving a passing grade on democracy for its flexibility 
in accommodating public participation, the OMB fell short in terms of equity when it came to 
mediating the disparity between the access to resources of represented parties and unrepresented 
participants. It also was insufficient in being a forum for a diverse range of participants and 
expressions of the public interest that were not older, white, upper-middle class, and property 
owners. Overall, the OMB left much to desired in terms public participation and urban justice. 
The chapter on LPAT began with very discouraging features that seemed to elevate some 
of the challenges that existed under the OMB, specifically a heightened dependency on expertise. 
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This was true particularly true in the requirement of public participants to explore the tests of 
consistency and conformity to policies developed by the professional planning community. It was 
also hindered by the requirement for the front loading of efforts and submissions required to 
participate. Most of this was alleviated, at least in theory, by the establishment of the LPASC 
which provided unrepresented public participants with tools and representation it required to meet 
the requirements and participate speaking the same language as everyone else. Democratically, 
LPAT gave City Council and the public a second voice. Conversely, when City Council’s decision 
is inconsistent with the public interests, the LPASC, as demonstrated by the first case study, was 
able provide the proper expertise required to negotiate a better iteration of good planning. With 
respect to equity, LPASC levels the playing field once dominated by those privileged with 
resources and access to experts. Finally, with diversity, proper representation will go a long way 
in facilitating a wide range of diverse public participants and expressions of public interests. 
The final chapter briefly considered the changes proposed by Bill 108 which, as of the date 
of this paper, has yet to come into full force and effect. While most of the reversions back to the 
OMB rules do not merit an analysis separate from what was already considered for the OMB, the 
change that put pressure on municipalities to process applications in an impossibly short timeframe 
puts public participation in grave danger. Eliminating opportunities for the municipality to consult 
with its constituents will not only detract from the acknowledgement of public interests, but also 
hinder the ability for public participants to rely on the information produced by the civil servants 
employed to do so. 
If the land use planning appeal system enacted by Bill 139 represented one step forward 
for public participation, early signs of Bill 108 seem to indicate that it will result in two steps 
backwards. Public participants seem to be trapped in a political contest between the provincial 
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governments of the past and present, in defining what they believe to constitute good planning and 
the public interest. While Bill 139 was far from perfect, what it taught us is that the inherent 
inequalities in the process can be mitigated, to some extent, by providing the public with the proper 
supports. A more comprehensive, better funded and staffed support centre will go a long way in 
improving public participation and enhancing justice. Nevertheless, these experts that we rely on 
must shift their focus from conducting a cost/benefit analysis to asking who is benefiting and who 
is bearing the costs. Only then can we plan or adjudicate towards a more just city. 
One area in which this paper fails is in accounting for are those who are not only 
unrepresented but also unheard, namely those who aren’t homeowners and those without the 
capacity to participate for various reasons. This deficiency cannot easily be rectified without a 
wholesale reform of the culture of land use planning in Ontario. Until then, discourses on public 
participation, good planning and urban justice must continue to ask, ‘who is the public’, ‘what are 
their interests’, ‘who benefits’ and ‘who bears the cost?’. 
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Appendix A – Schedule of Interviewee 
 
 
Participant Identifier Personal Capacity Professional Capacity Affiliation 
Public Interviewee 1 Active Resident 
Retired 
Transportation 
Planner 
Neighbourhood 
Association 
Public Interviewee 2 Active Resident Retired Neighbourhood Association 
Public Interviewee 3 Active Resident University Professor School of Planning 
Public Interviewee 4 Active Resident Retired Neighbourhood Association 
Public Interviewee 5 Active Resident Retired Neighbourhood Association 
Industry Interviewee 1  Professional Planner Private Planning Firm 
Industry Interviewee 2  Senior Planner City of Toronto 
Industry Interviewee 3  Land Use Planning Litigator Private Law Firm 
Industry Interviewee 4  Municipal Lawyer City of Toronto 
Industry Interviewee 5  Professional Planner, University Professor School of Planning 
Industry Interviewee 6  Staff Member 
Local Planning 
Appeal Support 
Centre 
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Appendix B – Schedule of Acronyms 
 
 
CMC  - Case Management Conference 
EMR  - Enhanced Municipal Record 
ETCC -  East Toronto Community Coalition 
LPASC - Local Planning Appeal Support Centre 
LPAT - Local Planning Appeal Tribunal 
LPATA - Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 
OMB  - Ontario Municipal Board 
OMBA - Ontario Municipal Board Act 
OP  - Official Plan 
OPA  -  Official Plan Amendment 
ZBA  - Zoning By-law Amendment 
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Appendix C – Sample of Notice Requirement 
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Appendix D – Sample of Public Notice 
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Appendix E – Sample of LPASC Service Agreement 
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